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Abstract 
In this thesis I study how home bias varies over time in context of international corporate bond 
underwriting. I observe that home bias in bank’s country level underwriting portfolio increases by 
27% on average when experiencing a crisis at its home market.  The effect is limited to transparent 
and higher quality issuers, indicating homogeneous treatment of more opaque and lower credit 
quality issuers during crisis independent of their geographic origin. I also show that banks tend to 
withdraw to lesser extent from markets where underlying sovereign credit quality is higher than 
the one in their home market, suggesting that the shift is somewhat driven by flight to quality 
considerations. 
 Moreover, I find that banks treat their relationship client firms equally during crisis regardless 
of their home origin. I also show that increase in home bias is positively correlated with 
geographical distance between the issuer and the underwriting bank. I find no evidence that the 
increase would be less severe when the underwriting bank shares common familiarity 
characteristics with the issuer.     
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1. INTRODUCTION	
It has been widely documented in the past literature that investors diverge from optimal capital 
allocation by overweighting domestic assets in their investment portfolios. This phenomenon 
known as home bias has been observed to take place widely among investors regardless of their 
geographical origin, investor type or asset class they are investing to (see e.g. Ahearne et al, 
2004; Gelos and Wei, 2005 and Butler, 2008). During the past 40 years researchers have sought 
source of this anomaly without finding a mutual consent on the fundamental reasons behind the 
phenomenon. 
Global financial crisis burst out summer 2007 in US emerged discussion on mechanism which 
drove the transformation of the crisis between economies. It has been well acknowledged that 
deterioration in financial market conditions followed by cut in international capital flows led to 
global contagion in the financial market (see e.g. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Forbes and 
Warnock, 2012). Yet researchers have been unable to agree on the underlying reason determining 
the drastic change behind investors’ preference to decrease their foreign exposures. First ones to 
approach this topic from home bias point of view have been Giannetti and Laeven who studied 
variation in home bias over time both in context of syndicated loan market and equity portfolios 
of US mutual funds (2012 and forthcoming). Their findings suggest that the cut in international 
capital flows can be attributed to investors’ increased preference for local assets when uncertainty 
in the market gets more severe. Their results are independent of underlying asset characteristics 
suggesting overall increase in investors’ risk aversion following the crisis.  
In principle, investors experiencing a crisis at their home market become more risk averse and re-
allocate their investment portfolio towards assets which they perceive to be less risky. If 
investors, at the same time, consider larger increase in riskiness of foreign assets compared to 
domestic ones they are induced to shift their investment portfolio towards their home markets and 
consequently increase home bias in their portfolio  
In this paper I will study how home bias puzzle has altered in context of international corporate 
bonds, a source of funding which use has surged following 2007 crisis. More specifically I will 
concentrate on distribution of bond underwriting mandates from bond issuers to underwriting 
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banks. When a firm wants to seek funding from public debt market it needs to hire itself an 
underwriting bank which act as an intermediary between the issuer and bond investors in the 
market. Bank’s ability to receive underwriting mandates is dependent on its capability to market 
and distribute the issues to potential investors compared to competing banks. I expect that both 
issuers and underwriting banks induce increased home bias in their decision making when 
uncertainty in the financial market increases. If this is the case, I will observe increased 
proportion of domestic issuers in bank’s total underwriting pool when negative shock hits bank’s 
home market. 
When discussing home bias in this context it is good note that underwriter-issuer relationship is 
not formed by a decision solely made either by the issuer or the underwriting bank but it should 
be seen as a consequence of both (Fernando et al, 2005). Banks look for issuers who they regard 
capable to enter the market and issuers look for banks who are capable to distribute them to 
investors. Bearing this in mind, my results should not be interpreted unilaterally from bank’s or 
issuer’s point of view but they should be seen as an outcome of a mutual choice between the two 
parties.   
1.1 Motivation for the research 
International bond markets provide an interesting research framework for my study. Size of the 
market has doubled since the ongoing financial crisis burst in 2007. At the same time, volume of 
direct bank lending has decreased drastically emphasizing increased importance of market based 
funding sources ex-post the crisis. In part the shift from bank loans to public debt can be 
explained by tightening capital regulation standards on banks’ capital adequacy determined in 
Basel II and Basel III frameworks. This has cut down availability of direct bank lending and 
forced borrowers to seek funding from other sources.  
Competition between banks for bond underwriting mandates has been widely studied following 
deregulation of the global banking market in the turn of the 1990’s. At the time, commercial 
banks were allowed to start to carry out underwriting services a business which was earlier 
dominated by investment banks. This let commercial banks that had traditionally been direct 
lenders utilize their knowledge from past relationships when competing for bond underwriting 
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mandates. It has been widely recognized in the literature that past lending relationship inducing 
monitoring incentive for the lender explains success of commercial banks in the underwriting 
market (see e.g. Gande, et al., 1997; Kang and Liu, 2007 and Yasuda, 2005). In my study I assess 
how past relationship between the bank and the issuer, either through direct lending or prior 
underwriting mandate alleviates increase in home bias when uncertainty increases in the market.  
In home bias literature one reason for investors’ diverge from optimal capital allocation has been 
proposed to emerge from familiarity factors (see e.g. Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001 and  Seasholes 
and Zhu, 2010). Familiarity reasons have yet gain little attention in literature when explaining 
variation in investors’ behavior over time in debt capital markets. Most prevailing theories have 
been flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality which both overlook possible existence of behavioral 
reasons when explaining demand variations.  
Although reasons behind home bias are found to be manifold existence of the phenomenon itself 
has been unquestionable. In my study, I seek to discover explaining factors for home bias in the 
context of bond capital markets and assess how importance of these factors vary within time. 
Existence of home bias in distribution of bond issue mandates has been previously found by 
Butler (2008) in US municipal bond market and Lau and Yu (2010) in international corporate 
bond market. To my knowledge no one has yet studied variation of home bias in distribution of 
underwriting mandates in the course of diverge economic conditions.  
1.2 Main findings 
I find existence of home bias in general throughout my results. When a bank experiences a crisis 
at its home market I observe increase of 27% in home bias of its monthly underwriting pool per 
country. The effect is limited to transparent and higher quality issuers, showing that banks treat 
more opaque and lower credit quality issuers homogeneously during crisis independent of their 
geographic origin. Moreover, the effect is no more present when excluding US and UK banks 
from my sample, indicating that banks outside these markets regard them as some sort of safe 
heaven during time of crisis. Also, the observed increase in home bias disappears when I limit my 
sample to markets where bank has had 10 or more underwriting mandates during the sample 
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period, suggesting that the effect is somewhat driven by larger withdrawal from less important 
markets. 
I do not find more pronounced effect for issuers domiciled in emerging markets suggesting that 
my findings are not explained by level of development at issuer’s home market. Increase in home 
bias remains similar when I limit my sample to higher credit quality issuers. I find no change in 
home bias for lower quality issuers when crisis hits bank’s home market but I do find increased 
foreign bias when crisis takes place at issuer’s home market.  
I observe that higher level of institutional development in issuer’s home country induces lower 
level of home bias in general. Banks are also more prone to withdraw from such distressed 
markets where availability of credit information is lower. When experiencing a crisis at their 
home market banks decrease their exposure to lesser extent in economies where sovereign credit 
rating is above the one in their home country. Similarly, when shock takes place at issuer’s home 
market banks increase their foreign bias more for economies where sovereign credit quality is 
higher compared to their home economy. 
I observe positive relation between bank’s prior underwriting record and amount of foreign 
underwriting in general but I do not find evidence that increase in level of home bias would be 
lower for more reputable banks. When limiting my sample to issuers which enter the market for 
the first time, I find statistically significant increase in bank’s foreign bias when uncertainty 
increases at issuer’s home market. This indicates increased importance of certification role of 
foreign banks when issuer’s credit quality is not yet known for the market. When entering the 
bond market for the first time information asymmetries between the issuer and potential investors 
are expected to be higher on average compared to issuers who have visited the market before. As 
crisis at issuer’s home market is likely to accelerate this information asymmetry further it is 
important for the issuer to hire a foreign underwriter which can assess and certify its credit 
quality objectively to potential investors.          
When regarding only issuers who have had a prior relationship with the underwriting bank, I 
observe lower level of home bias in general but no statistically significant change when negative 
shock takes place either in bank’s home or host market. When limiting my sample to issuers for 
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whom the bank has not acted as an underwriter during the prior five years, I find clear existence 
of foreign bias in general. Explanation derives from the fact that banks are on average more likely 
to have a prior relationship with domestic than foreign issuers. As number of domestic issuers is 
limited bank looking for new underwriting mandates have to look these outside its home market. 
Interestingly, I find that banks further increase amount of their new foreign relationships when 
crisis hits their home market. This effect, together with bank’s diversification efforts, is likely to 
be driven by deteriorating market conditions at bank’s home country thus limiting number of new 
domestic issues in general. 
I use set of different proxies to assess how importance of familiarity characteristics shared by the 
issuer and the underwriting bank varies over time. I find that level of home bias increases with 
geographical distance between the issuer and the underwriting bank when negative shock takes 
place at bank’s home market. Conversely, when crisis hits issuer’s home market banks increase 
their exposure more when issuer is geographically more distant. These results clearly indicate 
that the variation in home bias is associated with proximity.  
I observe higher level of home bias in general when the underwriting bank has same national 
language or legal origin with the issuer but find no evidence that banks would withdraw to lesser 
extent from these markets when uncertainty increases. Moreover, during home based shocks 
banks limit their exposure to crisis by decreasing their foreign exposures more in markets within 
the same currency area. I also find that banks increase their exposure to distressed markets within 
the same currency area when their home economy is not in crisis.  
1.3 Limitations of the study 
As my research scope is rather extensive both geographically and across corporates from distinct 
industrial backgrounds it can be that I am unable to observe sources of home bias which are 
attributable to a specific subgroup in my sample. I seek to overcome this limitation by conducting 
tests on sub-sample level but it is likely that differences exist beyond the ones which I am able to 
track in this study. Comprehensive detection of these differences requires dedicated research on 
different sub-samples which goes beyond the scope of this study. 
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Another limitation emerges from research methodology. I am using monthly amount of 
underwriting mandates received by bank in a given market relative to total underwriting volume 
of the bank during the period as a dependent variable in my regression model. As I use 
observations aggregated at bank level, I am not able to detect how issuer specific characteristics 
influence underwriting behavior per se. In order to observe variation in bank’s underwriting 
portfolio over time I have to treat underlying issue supply as a given constraint from the 
perspective of the bank. 
Moreover, as my results are limited to period when crisis has emerged and continues till the end 
of my sample period I am not able to assess variation in home bias when economic cycle turns 
back to positive. Consequently, I am also not able to detect if my results are driven by some kind 
of universal change in market practices which continues beyond the crisis.      
1.4 Structure of the paper 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces main theories related to the topic and 
main findings from the existing literature. Section 3 discusses my research problem and develops 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 develops the methodology I employ in this 
study. Section 6 reports the empirical results and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND	DISCUSSION	AND	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
2.1 Debt capital markets 
2.1.1 Development	of	modern	capital	markets	
Following the wave of deregulation which swept over banking sector in US in 1990’s 
commercial banks were permitted to carry out underwriting and other investment banking 
services. Similar development took place in Japan where Financial System Reform Act was 
launched in 1993. In Europe integration of banking system was mainly driven by the Second 
Banking Directive implemented in 1989. These changes in regulation enabled banks to expand 
their business both geographically and in scope creating model of universal banking where same 
bank can carry on both commercial banking and investment banking services. 
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The emergence of the new banking model enforced agency problems which had traditionally 
been associated with commercial banks. Bank financing and related monitoring function creates 
bargaining power over borrower’s profits for a lending bank compared to less well informed 
banks (Rajan, 1992). In the same vein universal banks offering bank financing for a specific firm 
face conflict of interest when acting as an advisor for the lender in capital markets. Better 
informed bank can exploit its information advantage by setting issuing firm’s cost of capital 
higher than it would be in efficiently informed markets.     
Findings in the literature have been contradictive what comes to effectiveness of the universal 
banking model from capital markets perspective. In their study on Japan market Kang and Liu 
(2007) find that bank with an information advantage face conflict of interest and expropriate rents 
from their borrowers in form of higher yields to appeal investors and gain market share in 
underwriting market. On the other hand, in the US certification role of universal banks has been 
found to offset conflict of interest both pre (Puri, 1996) and post 1933 Glass-Steagall act (Gande 
et al, 1997 and Yasuda 2005), showing that commercial banks transfer at least part of their 
competitive advantage to their borrowers in form of lower cost of capital when they enter 
securities underwriting business.  
2.1.2 Role	of	intermediaries	
Role of financial intermediaries has been extensively studied throughout the existence of capital 
markets. In their classical paper on role of intermediaries in financial market Leland and Pyle 
(1977) suggest that existence of intermediaries is primarily driven by information asymmetries 
between lenders and borrowers. Borrowers are not seen as credible information producers due to 
potential moral hazard they face even if markets function otherwise perfectly. Consequently, 
intermediaries are needed in the market to ensure information flows between the parties.   
The first ones to touch the issue in security issuance framework were Booth and Smith (1986) 
who developed the classical certification model of financial intermediaries. According to Booth 
and Smith financial intermediaries are needed in the capital markets to mitigate information 
asymmetries between well informed corporate insiders and investors. When a firm decides to 
seek external financing from capital markets underwriting bank can put its reputation at stake to 
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certify credit quality of an issuer. Bigger is the information discrepancy between the issuer and 
investors in capital markets more resources it takes by the underwriting bank to fill in this gap. 
As the underwriting bank has its own reputation at stake it’s in its own interest to signal issuer’s 
credit quality correctly to the market. Underwriters which have better access to inside 
information obtain competitive advantage over their less informed rivals. Less informed 
underwriters can offset this gap by allocating more resources to information retrieval but would 
then have to compensate increased costs by charging higher fees for their services. Underwriting 
bank can in a short run use less resources and signal issuer credit quality incorrectly but would 
consequently loose its reputation in the securities underwriting market. 
Beyond their role as an information producer underwriting banks are responsible for marketing, 
pricing and selling the issue to the investors through capital markets and preparing related admin 
documentation.  
2.1.3 Choice	between	bank	loan	and	public	debt	
Company’s debt financing has been traditionally seen as a choice between bank loan and public 
debt. Beyond issuer’s credit quality debt source available for a specific issuer is determined by 
difference in marginal costs between the two options. Opaque companies with more sensitive 
information are, on aggregate, more costly to monitor. Consequently, they are more likely to rely 
on bank financing due to lower marginal cost associated with bank monitoring compared to 
monitoring by individual bond investors. 
In his fundamental paper on corporate borrowing choice Diamond (1991) shows that there is an 
inverse relation between borrower’s reputation and bank loans. Borrowers with higher credit 
quality have lower cost to access public debt markets and lower benefit of bank monitoring 
taking place when relying on bank financing. Oppositely, lower credit quality borrowers face 
higher cost of accessing public debt compared to cost they face when alleviating agency 
problems through bank monitoring. 
As discussed by Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) volume in loan 
syndication market is primarily driven by banks’ ability to carry risk. In the situation of adverse 
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economic conditions borrowers start to utilize their credit lines committed by banks. Higher 
utilization of credit lines increases banks’ risk portfolio in general and put their own funding 
under pressure. This overall cut in availability of funding force banks to allocate their capital 
more carefully among their borrowers which leads to decrease in the aggregate amount of funds 
available in the loan market. 
From bank’s point of view arranging financing for a borrower through debt capital markets ties 
less capital in the long run, and is consequently less risky from financial point of view compared 
to traditional bank loan. In direct lending bank lends money from its balance sheet to borrower 
and assumes credit risk of the borrower throughout the lifetime of the loan. In bond issue bank’s 
risk exposure is limited to underwriting period of the transaction, i.e. the time when bank sells the 
issue to investors in bond market. 
2.1.4 Access	to	public	debt	market	
When a company decides to issue a bond it needs to hire itself an underwriting bank or a 
syndication of banks. The underwriting can be made either on bought deal or open priced deal 
basis. In a bought deal underwriting bank or syndicate of banks commits to purchase the bonds or 
certain proportion of them from the issuer with a minimum providing the issuer an insurance 
against situation where the whole issue is not subscribed by investors. In an open priced deal 
underwriting bank or syndicate of banks markets the issue and sells it directly to the market on 
the offering day. Usage and appropriateness of the two above mentioned methods differ 
depending on the market and issue specific features. For the sake of simplicity I do not 
distinguish between the two methods and use them in parallel in this paper. Simplified process of 
the bond issue is presented in figure 1.   
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From issuers perspective pivotal is how well underwriter is able to certificate the issue to 
potential investors in the market. Given underlying issuer characteristics well-known and 
established underwriters act as an assurance to investors leading to lower cost of capital and 
higher amount of funds available for a specific issuer in the market. Issuers are of course not 
homogenic and for some certification is more valuable than for others. Supportive findings have 
been made by both Puri (1996) and Yasuda (2005) who find that underwriters who have access to 
issuer specific information through their lending activities add most value for first time, junior, 
and informative sensitive issuers. This evidence strongly supports certification hypothesis and 
pinpoints special role that underwriters have as intermediaries. 
Important to bear in mind when considering performance of public capital markets is that there is 
large variation in issuing volumes even on weekly basis. Demand for certain type of issuers in the 
market is largely determined by macroeconomic factors and overall market sentiment. When 
issuer wants to enter the market it needs to have good understanding of the current market mood 
and appetite for the type of issuer it is. This job is done by underwriters who offer their views of 
the market to the issuer and propose when the issuer should enter the market and with which 
price. Underwriters’ opinions of market sentiment can vary largely and especially when 
uncertainty in the market is high possibilities to access the market are relatively short. In the end, 
underwriter who has the right understanding of the current market mood and the best knowledge 
of  the issuer credit quality is likely to be chosen as an underwriter.  
Figure 1 
Simplified bond issue process chart. This figure presents bond issue process and its main counterparties. 
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2.1.5 Pricing	fundamentals	
Cost of a bond issue for issuing company consists of fee paid to the underwriter(s) and yield 
investors are asking for the bond. Bank’s compensation consists of gross spread which is 
difference between the total amount issued to the market and the amount received by the issuer. 
This gross spread covers bank’s issue related expenses, such as marketing and preparation of 
related admin documentation and compensates for the risk of underwriting.   
By theory bond pricing in the market should reflect issuing company’s credit quality and features 
of the underlying security. In principle longer maturity and higher interest bearing securities 
should have higher yield (lower price). Higher credit quality and less opaque investors are able to 
issue their bonds with a lower yield leading to larger amount of capital raised from the market, 
ceteris paribus. Also from bank’s perspective it is more costly to market and sell bonds of less 
well-known issuer. In addition, amount of information bank has over a specific issuer varies 
depending on the depth and length of relationship between the two.  
Bank having concurrent lending relationship with an issuing company is found to have an 
informational advantage compared to non-lending rivals (Drucker and Puri, 2005). Underwriters 
at least partly transfer this cost saving to their clients in a form of lower underwriting fees and 
reduced cost of bank lending. Also opposing conclusions have been made. In a study by Hale and 
Santos (2009) authors find that issuers going for bond IPO face lower interest rate on their bank 
loans ex-post the issue stating that banks expropriate their informational monopoly ex-ante bond 
issuer entered the market for the first time. 
Diverge from equity capital markets where underwriter compensation based on 7% spread has 
been found to be the norm (Chen and Ritter, 2000) bond market has not been found to suffer 
from this kind of distortion. The most obvious reason for nonexistence of univeral pricing policy 
is heterogenic nature of the debt capital market both geographically and among distinct security 
classes. 
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2.2 Determinants of bond underwriter choice 
2.2.1 Home	bias	
Existence of home bias in investors’ capital allocation between domestic and foreign assets has 
been puzzling economists since its discovery in 1970s (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). This irrationality 
in investor behavior has aroused a vast amount of research where the phenomenon has been 
documented both among debt and equity investors (see e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; 
Ahearne et al, 2004). In recent home bias literature two alternative explanations for the existence 
of home bias have gained most attention: behavioral reasons driven by familiarity explanations 
(see e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010); and information asymmetries 
arising between investors according to their origin (see e.g. Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Ivkovic 
and Weisbenner, 2005).     
Information asymmetry explanation derives from the assumption that more proximate investors 
have better access to company specific information compared to distant players. Information 
advantage and resulting superior returns that local investors can gain have been studied among 
individual investors by Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005). They show that US households are able 
to gain abnormal returns by preferring local equities in their equity portfolios. Similar finding 
among institutional asset managers has been made by Coval and Moskowitz (2001). 
Contradictive finding has been made by Seasholes and Zhu (2010) who show that individual 
investors are not able to earn excess returns on their local stock portfolios but that home-bias is 
driven by investors’ preference for familiar assets in general. Familiarity reason is also promoted 
by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) who find that investors in Finnish stock market tend to prefer 
equities of companies which are yet geographically closer but also sharing common language and 
cultural characteristics with investors. Authors also show that importance of these familiarity 
proxies tend to decrease with level of investor professionalism.  
In their paper on information asymmetries and home bias Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 
(2009) argue that information asymmetries are reinforced by rational investors who decide to 
learn more about assets they already know in order maintain their information advantage. This 
leads to home-bias because investors have initially information advantage on local assets. 
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Supportive finding has been made by Bae et al (2008) who study performance of local and 
foreign equity analysts. They show that local analysts outperform foreigners and that their 
competitive advantage is inversely correlated with amount of publicly available information. 
In the same vein it has been shown that financial intermediaries gain information advantage when 
they are located nearby their clients. These information advantages have been found to be 
significant both in equity (Loughran, 2008), bond (Lau and Yu, 2010) and syndicated loan 
market (see e.g. Sufi, 2007; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). However, it has been shown in context of 
bank lending that economies of scale bank can achieve through its centralized monitoring 
operations are limited because monitoring expenses tend to increase with level of diversification 
in bank’s loan portfolio (see e.g. Acharya et al, 2006 and Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
Francis et al. (2007) study relation between the location of issuing firm’s headquarters and 
bondholders. They find that issuers located in remote rural areas where investor base is smaller 
face significantly higher cost of capital compared to issuers located in metropolitan areas where 
investors are located nearby the issuer. This is in line with presumption that monitoring is more 
costly for more distant investors and thus compensated through higher cost of capital for more 
distant issuers. Their finding is further supported by the fact such price anomaly does not exist 
for debt securities which are issued in private placement market. Private placement market has 
traditionally been dominated by institutional investors who are more strict in their monitoring 
policies and thus less prone to information asymmetries in general.  
Information disadvantage of rural firms has also been studied by Arena and Dewally (2012). In 
addition to pricing implications, they find that debt issues of rural firms are characterized by 
smaller syndicate sizes; use of less prestigious underwriters; shorter maturities; and increased 
preference for relationship banking type of deals. They observe no relation between the firm 
location and its capital structure further supporting the evidence that observed differences are due 
to information disadvantage caused by distant location not by issuer specific traits. 
Mian (2006) studied information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers in emerging 
markets and concluded that geographically more distant foreign banks are less likely to lend to 
firms operating in sectors of the economy where amount of soft information is high compared to 
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domestic lenders. Mian concludes that the result cannot be explained solely by geographical and 
cultural distance but that foreign banks are less likely to lend to certain sectors regardless of 
borrower’s underlying credit quality.  
Supportive evidence has been found by Giannetti and Yafeh (forthcoming) who show that large 
cultural differencies between contracting parties lead to less favorable contracting terms for the 
borrower in the syndicated loan market. This effect on cost and size of the loan is robust even 
when culturally distant bank is lending repeatedly in the market. The bias is also not hampered by 
including culturally less-distant lenders to the syndication but characterized by reduced risk 
sharing by participants, i.e. relatively lower loan ticket of participating banks compared to lead 
bank’s ticket when cultural distance between participating bank and lead bank increase. 
Fidora et al (2007) study role of currency exchange values in explaining home bias. They find 
that foreign exchange values are an important factor determining home bias in bilateral capital 
flows between economies. Moreover, they show that variation in home bias following change in 
real exchange rate volatility is relatively larger for bond than for equity portfolios. Their findings 
are in line with flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality features of bond markets. If investors 
perceive increase in riskiness of foreign exchange risk in their bond portfolios they will shift their 
holdings to markets with strong base currency. Similar effect is not as prevailing in equity market 
where foreign exchange values are not as defining part of valuation.      
2.2.2 Previous	bank	relationship	
Large part of the literature on relationship banking has focused on divergencies between 
commercial and investment banks. Main reason for this direction of research has been emergence 
of unique research set up following the wave of deregulation in the banking sector at the turn of 
1990s. Previous lending relationship between the issuer and the underwriting bank has been 
found to have positive and significant effects on both pricing and performance of the issue 
(Drucker and Puri, 2005). Similar finding has been made by Yasuda both in US (2005) and Japan 
(2007) bond market. In accordance with net certification hypothesis underwriters with access to 
issuer specific sensitive information, through lending or other concurrent business activities with 
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the issuer, will be seen as more reliable certifier of issuer credit quality in capital markets leading 
to lower cost of capital for the issuer. 
Yasuda (2005 and 2007) studied issuer’s probability to change underwriting bank and found that 
existing lending relationship between the issuer and underwriting bank reduces swtiching 
probability of underwriter by 32% in Japan and by 6% in US. Yasuda argues that large difference 
between the two is caused by differences in the banking systems. In Japan banking relationship is 
more valuable and changing of the bank costly, whereas in US pricing is market oriented and 
changing of the bank easier. 
Findings outside US and Japan on net certification hypothesis have been somewhat contradictive. 
Klein and Zoeller (2003) found in their study on the German IPO market that IPOs underwritten 
by universal banks are more underpriced than IPOs underwritten by specialized investment 
banks, showing that investors require compensation due to potential conflict of interest of 
universal banks. Still, their results support the importance of pre-existing lending relationship in 
securities underwriter choice as issuers are willing to use universal banks as underwriters despite 
they could get more accurate pricing by investment banks. Ursel and Ljucovic (1998) studied 
IPO market in Canada and find that universal banks are as good or better underwriters than 
investment banks in terms of underpricing. Similar finding has been made by Benzoni and 
Schenone (2010) in US markets. Possible explanation for the difference in the results can again 
be seen in differencies between market oriented financial system in US and Canada and bank 
oriented system in Germany. 
Kanatas and Qi (1998) concentrate in their study on informational economies of scope universal 
banks can attain when offering combined lending and underwriting services. They show that it is 
optimal for a firm to use universal bank as an underwriter if the economies scope are larger than 
costs caused by conflict of interest. Hence, ceteris paribus, high quality firms are better off using 
universal banks as their underwriters compared to low quality firms because cost caused through 
conflict of interest is lower for the first mentioned. Correspondingly, low quality firms will prefer 
independent investment banks who don’t face conflict of interest.       
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In a following study Kanatas and Qi (2003) study universal bank’s incentive to place effort into 
underwriting services when it has achieved a strong relationship with a specific firm. 
Strengthened market power of a universal bank reduces its incentive to make costly underwriting 
efforts compared to independent investment bank. Universal bank can profit from ancillary 
business whereas investment bank opportunity is limited to one-off type security issue deals. 
Consequently, universal banks are performing worse in selling issuer’s securities. Firms face a 
trade-off between benefiting from the informational economies of scope of a universal bank and 
capital market performance of an investment bank. As a result universal banks are likely to be 
chosen as an underwriter when economies of scope are large, i.e. amount of issuer specific 
sensitive information is high.  
Incentives of universal banks to carry on investemnt banking services has recently studied by 
Loranth and Morrison (2012). They show that universal banks have incentive to grant loans to 
low quality borrowers who would otherwise be in threat to go bust. Bank would not grant the 
loan on standalone basis but possible profits available through investment banking operations in 
the future outweight the negative expected return of the loan. This reduces borrowers incentives 
to exert effort to stay in budget because they anticipate that required financing is available at sub-
optimal effort levels. From capital markets’ perspective the implication can be expected to be 
relationship strengthening. Otherwise it would make no sense for a bank to grant the loan in the 
first place. 
Relation between size of the syndication group and issue quality has been studied by Shivdasani 
and Song (2011) who argue that commercial banks enter to underwriting market led to usage of 
co-led syndicate structures in origination which lowered lead bank’s incentive to monitor issuer 
quality. Authors compare issues between boom and bust market and conclude that on average 
lower quality issuers are able to access the market during boom periods when availability of 
funding is less scarce and investors’ own monitoring incentives low. This phenomenon is found 
to be particularly strong in industries where commercial banks captured themselves a substantial 
market share following the wave of deregulation.  
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2.2.3 Underlying	credit	quality	
Issuer credit rating given by an independent third party serves as an indicator of issuer’s credit 
quality to outside investors. Issuer credit rating does not tell much about the potential information 
asymmetries in securities underwriting market as such but it can serve as a good proxy for 
amount of information available for outside investors in general. Supportive finding has been 
made by Butler (2008) and Lau and Yu (2010) who both show that issuer credit quality is 
inversely correlated with the distance between the issuer and underwriting bank. This implicates 
that credit quality alleviates information advantage which geographically more proximate banks 
gain through their location.  
Disclosure requirements between countries have found to be one of the explanatory factors 
behind home bias puzzle of equity holdings (Ahearne et al, 2004). Authors study US investors’ 
equity holdings in international context and conclude that information asymmetries and 
subsequent under investment is most prominent in countries where disclosure requirements are 
low. Supportive evidence has been made by Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) who found “good 
country bias” in international equity markets. In case of weak investor protection wealthy 
investors have an incentive to utilize their dominant position by acquiring large block of shares 
and expropriate profits from non-controlling shareholders. Taking this into account, less wealthy 
investors with no possibility to acquire controlling position, whether being domestic or foreign, 
will withdraw from markets where investor protection is low leading to preference towards 
countries with high level of investor protection.  
Forbes (2010) studied the same phenomenon in US capital markets which has traditionally been 
in surplus and seen as one of the most developed financial market both in terms of liquidity and 
investor protection. Forbes argues that amount of foreign investment to US is inversely correlated 
with level of development of domestic financial markets. In the same vein, Butler (2008) finds in 
setting of US municipal bond issue underwriting that information asymmetry caused by issuer 
opaqueness leads to competitive advantage of more proximate underwriters. Similar finding has 
been made by Lau and Yu (2010) among international bond underwritings with a conclusion that 
proximate banks benefit most of their location in markets where investor protection is weak. Bae 
and Goyal (2009) show in their study on bank loans that banks adjust their contracting terms 
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according to level of legal protection in borrower’s home country leading to smaller size, shorter 
maturity and higher pricing for borrowers located in countries where legal protection for the 
creditor is lower.  
In country level study by La Porta et al (1997, 1998), authors find negative relation between 
investor protection set by national laws and size of local capital markets. The result is particularly 
prevailing in French civil law countries, signaling unfavorable environment for investors. 
Common-law countries are seen as one with the strongest level of legal protection, German and 
Scandinavian civil law countries located in between. In following study by Djankov et al (2007) 
authors found positive relation between legal creditor rights, information sharing system and 
amount of private credit to gross domestic product. According to their findings relation between 
creditor rights and amount of private credit to gross domestic product is more pronounced in 
richer countries whereas prevaliling information sharing system is more decisive in poorer 
countries. Moreover, French civil law system characterized by strong government control is 
found to be most efficient legal system in less developed countries where need for public 
information sharing is higher.  
2.2.4 Bank	reputation	
Underwriting bank’s quality as an information producer is measured by its past performance in 
the capital market. Underwriters with strong track record have shown their ability to successfully 
place issues to the market. In order to create reputation as a credible underwriter bank has to 
utilize its resources to distinguish lemons from pears. Miss assessment of underlying credit 
quality will deteriorate underwriting bank’s credibility to certify firm value, and as a consequence 
lead to higher cost of capital for issuers using the given bank as an underwriter in the future. In 
equity capital markets, Carter (1992) has shown that underwriter’s likelihood to get a subsequent 
equity mandate from the same issuer is positively correlated with underwriter’s reputation. 
Supporting finding has been made by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) who found that 
underwriter’s reputation is positively correlated with its ability to reduce information 
asymmetries in the equity market and the amount of capital raised through IPO. Moreover, 
authors show that underwriters subsequently over-pricing IPOs lose market share in the long run. 
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Also contradictive findings exist. Beatty and Welch (1996) studied equity IPOs from 1980 to 
1994 and found that relation between underwriter’s reputation and level of underpricing turned 
from positive to negative in period 1992-1994. Cooney et al. (2001) showed that this finding 
holds only for issues which are priced in the market outside their initial price range. More recent 
finding is made by Fernando et al. (2005) who show that there is a negative relation between 
market share of high reputation underwriters and overall issue activity and a positive relation 
between the quality of issues and overall issue activity, implicating that high reputation 
underwriters have more stable revenue streams than their less reputable competitors.  
McKenzie and Takaoka (2008) study bond markets in Japan and find that deterioration in 
underwriter’s credit rating between the first and second public bond issue significantly increases 
the probability of changing the underwriting bank. They also find evidence that lead underwriter 
who is able to increase the degree of overpricing of the first issue is more likely to be chosen as a 
lead underwriter for a subsequent offering. 
Fang (2005) find in his study on US bond market that high reputation underwriters decrease the 
level of underpricing and charge higher fees for their services, thus producing increase in net 
proceeds for the issuer. In line with the positive relation between the certification role and 
underwriter reputation high quality underwriters are more cautious when underwriting junk bond 
issuers. Underwriters commit only to lower credit quality issues which they anticipate superior in 
their class. This “cherry-picking” leads to significantly larger price improvement for high yield 
issuers compared to investment grade category where this kind of selection is not found to be 
present.        
2.3 Banking and capital allocation under adverse economic conditions 
2.3.1 Flight‐to‐quality	and	Flight‐to‐liquidity		
Well acknowledged fact in credit quality literature has been that investors’ appetite for low 
quality assets decreases during economic downturns leading to shift towards higher quality 
assets. Lang and Nakamura (1995) studied this flight-to-quality phenomenon in loan markets and 
found countercyclical effect in bank lending, meaning that banks allocate their credits towards 
higher quality players when monetary policy in the country gets tighter.    
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Similar finding has been made by Bernanke et al (1996) but emphasis on agency costs of lending. 
Their findings suggest that borrowers with the highest agency cost face the most drastic shock in 
availability of credit following the change in economic conditions. In theoretical model by 
Vayanos (2004) it has been shown that flight to quality is associated with flight to liquidity. 
During periods of economic uncertainty volatility increases which leads to relatively larger 
increase in risk premium of less liquid assets. 
Johnson et al (2000) studied  role of corporate governance and particularly protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights in relation to drastic currency depreciation and stock market decline during 
the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 in emerging markets. Their findings suggest that national 
legislation play an important role in transmission of external shocks. In related study Gelos and 
Wei (2005) studied flight to quality in context of both country and corporate level transparency in 
emerging markets and found robust evidence of investors’ preference for transparency. On 
aggregate international investors tend to hold more transparent corporates in more transparent 
markets. During crises the flight away effect is strongest in countries with lowest level of 
transparency further supporting existence of high quality country bias. 
Relation between credit quality and liquidity has been studied by Ericsson and Renault (2006) 
who found positive correlation between the two in US corporate bond market. Beber et al (2008) 
studied bond investors’ preference between credit quality and liquidity in context of Eurozone 
sovereign bond market. They find that in principle bond investors prefer credit quality in their 
portfolios but in times of increased uncertainty they shift towards liquidity.  
2.3.2 Increased	familiarity	bias	
Anomalies in investors’ behavior over time have also been found in context of equity portfolios. 
Bohn and Teaser (1996) found that international equity investors from US tend to allocate their 
investment portfolio according to past returns. Selling recent winners and buying recent losers 
leads to returns which are below the average in the market. Similar results have been presented 
by Kim and Wei (2002) during Koren crisis between 1997 and 1998. They show that return 
chasing behavior of foreign investors in Korean market reinforces during the crisis. Moreover, 
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domestic investors who used to be non-return chasers turn to be one when economic uncertainty 
increases.  
Contradictive finding has been made by Curcuru et al (forthcoming) who show that US investors 
do not chase returns when allocating their international equity portfolios but that they on 
aggregate enter markets before boom periods. In recent study by Giannetti and Laeven 
(forthcoming) on US mutual fund portfolios authors show that local bias is reinforced during 
crises. Their results are not explained by superior performance of local stocks indicating 
existence of flight-to-familiarity effect during crisis. 
Supportive evidence has been presented by Barberis (forthcoming) who argues that behavioral 
reasons and more precisely increase in investors’ loss aversion following decreasing asset prices 
during financial crisis of 2007-2008 can in part explain investors’ home bias during the crisis. As 
asset prices shrunk dramatically in relatively short period investors faced significant losses in 
their portfolios which made them to appraise downwards their own competence as an investor. 
As investors became more risk averse they started to prefer local assets which they regarded 
safer, hence increasing home bias in their investment portfolios. 
Similar finding has been made by Guiso et al (2012) who show that investors’ risk aversion 
increases ex-post negative experiences such as financial crisis. They suggest that variation in risk 
aversion and following increase in home bias can be at least partly attributed to psychological 
factors such as increased sense of fear. In their paper on risk aversion and past experiences 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that past experiences indeed have a significant effect on 
individual’s willingness to take risk. Their results are based on Survey of Consumer Finances for 
time period 1960-2007 indicating that past experiences have a long lasting effect on individual’s 
risk aversion.        
2.3.3 Flight	home	effect	
Financial crisis burst in 2008 induced researchers to challenge traditional flight-to-quality 
explanations of capital allocation. It was widely observed during the crisis that banks’ shift their 
capital towards home markets. Impact of bank’s home-bias in capital allocation is not only 
limited to its position vis a vis its competitors in international banking markets but serves as a 
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shock transmission channel between the bank’s home markets and host markets. Bank 
experiencing a crisis at its home markets transmits part of this shock to markets where it has 
clients by cutting down the supply of credit to that market. Interestingly this flight-home-effect 
has been found to be independent of credit quality, and hence in contradiction with the flight-to-
quality explanations proposed earlier in the literature. 
The phenomenon has been studied by Giannetti and Laeven (2012) in context of syndicated loan 
market. Authors show that drastic decrease in amount of capital available for borrowers through 
global syndicated loan market during crisis can be partly explained by home-bias in bank’s 
capital allocation. Banking crisis taking place in bank’s home market decreases probability that 
bank grants a loan to a foreign borrower by some 20%. Their results are independent of 
borrowers’ credit quality suggesting that familiarity considerations play some role in bank’s 
decision making while allocating capital to borrowers. 
Similar finding has been made by Presbitero et al (2012) in their study on regional loan market in 
Italy. They show that during the crisis credit available to borrowers was cut down more severely 
in areas where distance between the local branch and bank headquarters is long. Moreover, 
inconsistent with flight-to-quality explanation, their result is found to be most prevailing among 
large and healthy firms. Somewhat contradictive finding has been made by De Haas and van 
Horen (2011) who find that previous lending relationship and syndicates formed with local banks 
alleviates foreign bank’s home bias in loan origination during crisis. Their results suggest that 
information asymmetries would be an important determinant in bank’s capital allocation puzzle.  
3. HYPOTHESIS	
Hypothesis 1: Bond issuers prefer geographically proximate banks when distributing 
underwriting mandates.   
Investors’ preference for local assets has been extensively observed across different asset classes 
and investor types (see e.g. Ahearne et al., 2004 and Curcuru et al, forthcoming). Supportive 
evidence from bond markets has been presented by both Butler (2008) in context of US 
municipal bonds and by Lau and Yu (2010) in framework of international bond issues. I expect 
that bond issuers’ tendency to prefer domestic banks when distributing underwriting mandates 
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holds also when looking at distribution of received mandates at level of individual bank’s total 
underwriting portfolio. 
Hypothesis 2: Home bias in distribution of bond underwriting mandates increases during adverse 
economic conditions. 
As found by Giannetti and Laeven both in syndicated loan (2012) and equity (forthcoming) 
portfolios investors’ preference for geographically more proximate assets increase during crisis. 
The same is expected to hold when bond issuers distribute underwriting mandates to banks. As 
suggested already by Booth and Smith (1986) those intermediaries which have the best capability 
to certify issuer credit quality to potential investors should be chosen as underwriters. Whether 
driven by information asymmetries as argued by Coval and Moskowitz (2001) or familiarity 
reasons as framed by Seasholes and Zhu (2010) home bias in distribution of underwriting 
mandates is prone to increase with uncertainty.    
Hypothesis 3: Increase in home bias is a result of bank’s preference to underwrite higher credit 
quality issuers during crisis. 
Nakamura (1995) followed by many others (see e.g. Bernanke et al, 1996) have suggested that 
change in capital flows during adverse economic conditions is driven by investors’ increased 
preference for higher quality assets. I expect that same holds when banks seek for bond issue 
mandates. Higher quality issuers are less risky to underwrite, and hence bank’s desire for such 
issuers increase following the crisis. 
In the same vein, I expect that banks withdraw less from markets where institutional development 
and underlying credit quality in general is higher. Johnson et al (2000) have shown that investors 
are more prone to withdraw from distressed markets where investor protection determined by 
national legislation is low. Similarly, Gelos and Wei (2005) have found that investors withdraw 
to lesser extent from more transparent markets where availability of information in general is 
high.         
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Hypothesis 4: Prior relationship between the underwriting bank and the issuer alleviates 
increase in home bias. 
As observed by Yasuda both in US (2005) and Japan (2007) bond markets underwriting banks 
with an existing lending relationship with the issuing firm are more likely to be mandated as an 
underwriter for a bond issue. In accordance with net certification hypothesis lending banks are 
assumed to have better access to issuer specific information, and hence have better ability to 
serve issuing firm compared to banks that don’t have access to company specific information. I 
expect that this inside information is relatively more valuable when uncertainty increases, thus 
inducing smaller increase in home bias in case of foreign issuers who have had a prior 
relationship with the underwriting bank. 
Hypothesis 5: Decrease in proportion of foreign underwritings during crisis is smaller for more 
reputable banks. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) have shown that there is positive relation between underwriting 
bank’s reputation and its ability to reduce information asymmetries between the issuer and 
investors in equity markets. In a later study, Fernando et la (2005) have shown that underwriters 
with higher underwriting reputation are less prone to lose their market share when overall issue 
activity goes down. I hypothesize that bank reputation dilutes negative effects of home grown 
shocks, thus enabling reputable bank to retain its foreign market share. Moreover, I expect that 
bank with high prior bond underwriting volume is able to grow its market share in foreign 
distressed markets. Reputable bank has shown its ability to reduce information asymmetries. 
Consequently, its competitive position relative to less reputable banks strengthens as information 
asymmetries grow with increasing level of uncertainty in the market.  
Hypothesis 6: Increase in home bias is less pronounced when the underwriting bank share 
common familiarity characteristics with the issuer. 
Familiarity characteristics have found to breed home bias in stock markets and make investors to 
diverge from optimal capital allocation (Seasholes and Zhu, 2010). In the same vein, geographic 
proximity and common familiarity traits have found to explain capital allocation in Finnish 
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equity market (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). I expect that same holds when bond issuers 
distribute underwriting mandates. As argued by Barberis (forthcoming), overall risk aversion 
increases following the crisis making market participants to prefer more familiar and seemingly 
less risky alternatives in their decision making. I expect that when sharing common familiarity 
characteristics with a foreign issuer bank is less likely to withdraw its exposure from the market.   
4. EMPIRICAL	METHODOLOGY	
4.1 Methodology 
Methodology of my study follows largely the one introduced by Giannetti and Laeven (2012) in 
their paper. Distinct from the reference paper where geographic proximity hypothesis is studied 
in context of syndicated loan market I will assess home bias in distribution of underwriting 
mandates in international bond markets. Whereas Giannetti and Laeven study bank lending 
decisions, i.e. direct bank lending, I will study issuer’s choice of underwriting bank when it 
decides to enter bond market. Following the discrepancy in research context new control 
variables are introduced and some left out to better match the fundamentals of international bond 
markets. The control variables are discussed more in detail in the section 4.4. 
I will assess value of underwriting mandates of international bond issues obtained by a given 
bank in a specific country in US dollars during a month relative to total value of underwriting 
mandates obtained globally by the bank. Notable is that I will use aggregated amount of 
underwriting mandates obtained by a specific bank during a month at country level. By using 
global amount of underwriting mandates as a denominator I can perceive changes taking place 
within bank’s geographical underwriting portfolio given economic conditions. This enables me to 
capture changes in competitive position between banks rather than changes in overall issue 
volume or relation between issuer specific traits and market accessibility as done earlier by Butler 
(2008) and  Lau and Yu (2010). 
4.2 Base regression model 
I will estimate base regression model using ordinary least squares. Underwriting share of a bank i 
of issues in country j during month t is modeled as follows: 
26 
 
 
 
Issueijt = α1 Foreign issueij + α2 Foreign issueij x Shock bank countryit + α3 Foreign issueij x 
Shock issuer countryjt + Domestic issuesjt + Shock bank countryit + νXijt + εijt  (1)  
where Foreign issueij is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the nationality of bank i is different 
from the nationality of the issuer, and zero otherwise; Shock bank countryit measures shock 
taking place in the home country of the underwriting bank; Shock issuer countryit measures shock 
taking place in the home country of the issuer; Xijt is a vector of control variables; and εijt is an 
error term. 
A negative value for coefficient α1 implies that there is home bias in bond underwriting market in 
general. More interesting from my study’s point of view is coefficient α2: Negative value 
implying that fewer underwriting mandates are granted to foreign underwriters when economic 
shock in bank’s home country takes place. Variety of issuer, country and bank specific proxies is 
used to find reasons for the anticipated change in competitive position. These control variables 
are described more in detail in the following section. 
Interaction term Foreign issueij x Shock issuer countryjt is included in the regression to capture 
potential flight-to-quality effect. Negative value of the coefficient would imply that banks 
withdraw from foreign markets to home markets where they perceive underlying credit quality to 
be higher. In order to assess potential flight-to-quality I also study separately emerging markets 
which are traditionally seen as a market where outflow of capital is most apparent. More 
intensified withdrawal from emerging markets compared to developed markets would again 
promote existence of flight-to-quality effect. 
Domestic issuesjt variable controls for volume of domestic underwritings at country j at time t 
relative to total issue volume in international bond market. In order to capture potential time-
specific changes in the bond issue market I include year-month fixed effects to my regression 
model. To control for differences between issuer countries I include issuer country fixed effects. 
Time and issuer country fixed effects are also used to control for main effects of non-time 
invariant issuer country specific terms of my interaction variables, namely Shock issuer countryit 
interaction term. To do the same at bank country level I include Shock bank countryit as an 
independent variable to my model. When using three-way interaction, I include each interaction 
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term and its compound effect with other interaction terms as independent variables to my model 
when not controlled by interconnections of other independent variables in the model. 
4.3 Regression variables 
All regression variables and their descriptive statistics are presented in table 1. Variables are 
divided to four different sub-groups according to their origin. Bank-country-time group includes 
variables which are by their definition specific to a certain bank i in country j at time t. Country-
time group include variables that are specific to country j at time t in general. Bank group 
includes variables which are attributable to a certain bank i and constant over the time period. 
Country group includes variables which are attributable to a certain country j and constant over 
the time period.  
The main dependent variable is underwriting share which is constructed by taking monthly 
volume of underwritings by bank i in country j relative to total amount of international bond 
underwritings by the bank during the month. The main control variable for issue volume in 
country j is Domestic Issues which represents amount of underwritings done by domestic banks 
in country j at time t relative to total issue volume in the international bond market during that 
month. Underwriting Share and Domestic Issue variables are constructed correspondingly for 
different sub-samples. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. Table displays summary statistics of the main regression variables. Bond issue variables are computed using data from SDC New Issues database. 
Country variables are gathered from World Bank's Global Economic Monitor, Doing Business and World Development Indicators databases if not specified otherwise.  The 
sample consist of 11 144 observations over the period 2002-2011. 
Variable  Definition  Mean St. Dev. Median N 
Bank‐country‐time specific variables 
Underwriting share  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i in country j at time t/Total 
underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t  
0.34 0.35 0.18 11 144 
Underwriting share ‐ quarterly data  t as a quarter instead of a month  0.24 0.32 0.08 7 886 
Bias  Bias(ijt) = 1 ‐ (Underwriting share(ijt) / Sharecountry (jt), where 
sharecountry (jt) is the proportion of the bond issues in country j with 
respect to the total amount of bond issues at time t  
‐20.36 111.88 ‐1.97 11 144 
Underwriting share ‐ listed issuers  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i by listed issuers in country j at 
time t/Total underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t   
0.34 0.34 0.19 8 699 
Underwriting share ‐ non‐listed issuers  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i by non‐listed issuers in country 
j at time t/Total underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t   
0.24 0.32 0.10 3 766 
Underwriting share – Investment Grade issues  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i by IG rated issuers in country j 
at time t/Total underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t  
0.34 0.34 0.19 9 023 
Underwriting share – High Yield issues  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i by HY rated issuers in country j 
at time t/Total underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t  
0.19 0.27 0.07 1 499 
Underwriting share – government involvment  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i by government‐owned issuers 
in country j at time t/Total underwriting mandates granted to bank i at 
time t   
0.27 0.33 0.11 1 527 
Underwriting share ‐ first‐time issuer  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i in country j at time t by first‐
time issuers/Total underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t   
0.29 0.33 0.14 4 686 
Underwriting share ‐  non‐previous issuers  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i in country j at time t by issuers 
whose bonds have not been previously(t‐5) underwritten by the 
bank/Total underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t   
0.88 0.24 1.00 7 979 
Underwriting share ‐ previous issuers  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i in country j at time t by issuers 
whose bonds have been previously(t‐5) underwritten by the bank/Total 
underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t   
0.25 0.29 0.14 5 155 
Underwriting share ‐ loan relationship  Underwriting mandates granted to bank i in country j at time t by issuers 
who have had a loan relationship with the bank (t‐5)/Total underwriting 
mandates granted to bank i at time t   
0.26 0.28 0.15 3 070 
Underwriting share ‐ number of mandates  Number of underwriting mandates granted to bank i in country j at time 
t/Total number of underwriting mandates granted to bank i at time t  
0.34 0.34 0.20 11 144 
 
Average number of participants  Average number of participants in issues underwritten by bank i in 
country j at time t 
4.92 3.81 4.00 11 144 
Average issue size (USD million)  Average total size of issues granted to bank i in coutry j at time t‐12  626.49 353.68 593.56 8 861 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Variable  Definition  Mean St. Dev. Median N 
Average spread (%)  Average gross spread of an issue underwritten by bank i in country j at 
time t‐12 
0.62 0.51 0.50 5 370 
Average maturity (years)  Average maturity of an issue underwritten by bank i in country j at time 
t‐12 
8.63 4.01 8.00 8 145 
Issue share in domestic currency  Proportion of issues underwritten in country j at t‐12 in its domestic 
currency of the bank i 
0.38 0.38 0.22 10 900 
Diversification  Number of markets  where bank j has acted as an underwriter at time t‐
12
16.87 10.21 17.00 11 144 
Country‐time specific variables 
Domestic issues Underwritings by domestic banks in country j at time t/Total issue 
volume at time t 
0.05 0.10 0.01 11 144 
       
Domestic listed issuers  Underwritings by domestic banks to listed issuers in country j at time 
t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.04 0.08 0.00 8 699 
       
Domestic non‐listed issuers  Underwritings by domestic banks to non‐listed issuers in country j at time 
t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.03 0.05 0.00 3 766 
       
Domestic government owned issuers  Underwritings by domestic banks to government owned issuers in 
country j at time t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.00 0.01 0.00 1 527 
       
Domestic first time issues  Underwritings by domestic banks to first time issuers in country j at time 
t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.03 0.06 0.00 4 686 
Domestic non‐relationship issuers  Underwritings by domestic banks to non‐previous issuers in country j at 
time t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.04 0.07 0.00 7 979 
Domestic bond relationship issues  Underwritings by domestic banks to previous bond issuers in country j at 
time t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.03 0.06 0.01 5 155 
Domestic loan relationship issues  Underwritings by domestic banks to previous borrowers in country j at 
time t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.05 0.07 0.01 3 070 
Domestic Investment Grade issues  Underwritings by domestic banks to Investment Grade issuers in country 
j at time t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.04 0.08 0.01 9 023 
Domestic High Yield issues  Underwritings by domestic banks to High Yield issuers in country j at time 
t/Total issue volume at time t 
0.00 0.01 0.00 1 499 
Shock bank country  Dummy variable that equals one if the home country of the underwriter 
experiences a banking crises at time t, and zero otherwise 
0.48 0.50 0.00 11 144 
Shock issuer country  Dummy variable that equals one if the home country of the issuer 
experiences a banking crises at time t, and zero otherwise 
0.38 0.49 0.00 11 144 
       
Market return in bank country  % change in  value of stock market index in home country of the bank  0.01 0.05 0.01 11 107 
Market return in issuer country  % change in  value of stock market index in home country of the issuer  0.01 0.06 0.02 10 418 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Variable  Definition  Mean St. Dev. Median N 
Emerging market  Dummy variable that equals one if GDP per capita of the issuer country is 
below US$10,000 for the year when issue takes place, and zero 
otherwise 
0.10 0.30 0.00 11 102 
Credit information  Depth of credit information index at issuer home country from World 
Bank's Doing Business database (1‐7, low value indicating more 
availability of information) 
2.00 1.32 2.00 8 441 
Legal rights  Strength of legal rights index at issuer home country from World Bank's 
Doing Business database (1‐11, low value indicating stronger creditor 
rights)
3.76 2.03 4.00 8 441 
Legal rights bank Strength of legal rights index from World Bank's Doing Business database 2.90 1.68 2.00 8 602 
  in bank’s home country   
S&P rating issuer  S&P rating of the issuer country's government debt (1=highest)  2.64 3.21 1.00 11 033 
S&P rating bank ‐ S&P rating issuer  Underwriter home country's sovereign debt rating ‐ S&P rating issuer  ‐1.14 3.31 0.00 11 032 
Bilateral investment  Proportion of direct investment from home country of the bank i to 
issuer country j during the year when the issue takes place from IMF's 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) 
0.07 0.08 0.05 7 331 
Issuer home country stock market size of GDP  Total market value of listed companies in country j to total value of GDP 
at year end from World Bank's Global Financial Development database 
0.97 0.67 0.85 10 988 
Large issuer  Dummy variable that equals one if average pre‐issue amount of issuers' 
total assets is above the mean total asset value during the sample period, 
and zero otherwise 
0.29 0.45 0.00 6 541 
   
Country specific variables 
Religion match  Dummy variable that equals one if prevailing religion in country j is the 
same as the one in bank i home country, and zero otherwise 
0.49 0.50 0.00 10 170 
Legal environment match  Dummy variable that equals one if prevailing legal system in country j is 
the same as the one in bank i home country, and zero otherwise 
0.48 0.50 0.00 10 170 
Currency match  Dummy variable that equals one if national currency in country j is  the 
same as the one in bank i home country, and zero otherwise 
0.32 0.47 0.00 11 140 
Language match  Dummy variable that equals one if official language in country j is same 
as the one in bank i home country, and zero otherwise 
0.4293 0.495 0 11 144 
Distance  Log of physical distance in kilometers between the capital city of the 
issuer's country and the underwriter's country; zero for domestic issues 
6.24 3.40 7.30 11 046 
Bank specific variables 
League table position  Amount of total issues underwritten by bank j globally at t‐12 / Total 
issue volume at t‐12  
0.16 0.12 0.15 11 144 
Foreign underwriter Dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter's nationality is 
different from that of the issuer, and zero otherwise 
0.79 0.41 1.00 11 144 
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5. DATA		
5.1 International bond issues 
Bond issue data is obtained from SDC New Issues Database including information on issuers, 
underwriting banks, pricing and non-pricing terms at origination. Information is extracted for the 
period 2002-2011 including issues in 87 countries by 280 different banks from 53 different 
countries. All in all the data consists of 11 549 separate international corporate bond issues with a 
median issue amount of USD 325 million. In order to study evolution of specific bank’s bond 
underwriting volume over time rather than changes in the total supply of bond issues I aggregate 
issues by a given bank during a month at country level. 
I measure bank’s underwriting activity as a dollar amount of bond issues where bank has been in 
bookrunner or joint bookrunner role. If a given issue is underwritten by more than one bank, i.e. 
bookbuilding is run by joint bookrunners, I have divided the total amount of the issue by number 
of bookrunners. This is likely to increase the underwritten amount per bank in my model 
compared to actual underwritten amount the bank has had in the issue due to fact that 
underwriters at lower level are ignored. 
Same way as Lau and Yu (2010) I will exclude all financial sector issuers from my sample as 
these entities are such which are likely to act both as issuers and underwriters in the market. 
Moreover, financial firms operate in highly regulated market compared to corporates which is 
expected to be reflected also to the fundamentals of the market as such. If deemed, it would be 
more appropriate to study financials and corporates in two different sub-samples but 
extensiveness of such study goes beyond the scope of my research. 
I will aggregate the data at parent bank level meaning that banks belonging to same bank group 
will be treated as one bank. As I use nationality of the bank to define whether the underwritten 
amount is treated as domestic or foreign use of subsidiary level bank observations would be 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, a vast amount of banks have their capital market functions 
placed in subsidiary which is based in financial center different from their home country. This 
capital market subsidiary acts as an intermediary between the relationship bank and the issuer by 
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originating and executing the issue to the market. Treating these capital market subsidiaries as 
separate entities would cause error to my results as issues underwritten by them would be 
perceived to be underwritten by bank operating in different market where the relationship bank is 
actually based. Secondly, even if bank has local presence in a foreign country strategic decisions 
including allocation of bond origination resources are likely to take place at the bank’s head 
office. Bank top management is likely to have the same nationality as the (parent) bank, and 
hence biased towards bank’s home market in their decision making. Regarding bank’s foreign 
branches or subsidiaries as separate entities would lead to larger amount of domestic observations 
in my sample although the decisive power would be at the parent bank level. This would be likely 
to dilute the home bias effect and lead to contradictive results in context of my study. 
5.2 Other data sources 
Country level data is extracted from multiple sources including World Bank, IMF and CIA 
Factbook databases. In order to separate emerging markets from developed markets I have 
extracted annual country level Gross Domestic Product from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. Nations with GDP per capita less than USD 10,000 are regarded as emerging markets 
during the year of observation. All in all there are issuers from 55 countries which are regarded to 
be emerging market at some point of the sample period. 
Annual bilateral investment from bank’s home country to issuer’s home country is from IMF's 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). Data includes portfolio investment holdings in 
equity and debt securities by economy per source country. This data is not available for year 2011 
at the time of writing of this study. 
Information on legal system prevailing in country is as presented by Porta et al (1999) and CIA 
Factbook (2003). Legal systems are classified according to their origin to five groups: English, 
French, German, Nordic and Socialist. Dominant religion per country is extracted from Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) and CIA Factbook (2003). Nine religion classifications are Athiest, Buddhist, 
Catholic, Hindu, Indigenous, Judaism, Muslim, Orthodox and Protestant. National currencies are 
collected manually from multiple sources including Nations Online and CIA Factbook (2003). 
33 
 
 
 
Language data is extracted from CEPII GeoDist dataset and previously used by Mayer and 
Zignago (2011).  
The depth of credit information and strength of legal rights indices are from World Bank’s Doing 
Business dataset. The depth of credit information index measures rules affecting the scope, 
accessibility, and quality of credit information available through either public or private credit 
registries in a given country. In my sample the index ranges from one to seven, lower value 
indicating more availability of credit information. The strength of legal rights index measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders in the 
country. Index value varies between one and eleven, lower value indicating stronger legal 
protection.  
Distance is natural logarithm of geographic distance in kilometers between capital cities of issuer 
and bank home country. Calculation is based on latitude and longitude of capital cities as 
presented by Gleditsch and Ward (2001). 
5.3 Adverse economic conditions 
To measure adverse economic conditions I obtain start and end dates of systemic banking crises 
from Laeven and Valencia (2010). They determine systemic banking crises to take place when 
there is signs of financial distress in the banking system (indicated by significant bank runs, 
losses in the banking system, and bank liquidations); and significant government intervention 
measures through changes in banking policies in response to losses faced by the banking system. 
First year when both of these conditions are met is used as a starting year of the banking crisis. 
End point of the crisis is defined as a year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are 
positive at least for two consecutive years. 
According to systemic banking crises data all in all 25 different countries faced a crisis during the 
sample period. 17 of these countries are regarded as a cases where the crisis is systemic (at least 
three out of five government interventions have taken place); and 8 as borderline cases (less than 
three government intervention measures have taken place). 
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Figure 2 
Total annual amount of international bond issues (USD billion) between 2002 and 2011. This figure shows total amount
of international bond issues in USD billion globally in a given year during the period 2002-2011. Data is gathered from
SDC New Issues database.    
 
I have constructed alternative crisis measure by taking monthly return of stock market index in 
country j from World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor (GEM) database. Negative stock market 
return indicates existence of increased uncertainty whereas positive return is indication of normal 
market environment in the country during the month. All in all stock market index data is 
available for 66 out of 87 countries in my sample. Months with negative and positive stock 
market return observations total 3 655 and 4 928, respectively.  
5.4 Stylized facts 
Amount of capital raised from debt capital markets has altered remarkably over years. Figure 2 
shows total amount of international bond issues at annual level. The size of the market over 
tripled from stable EUR 300 billion between 2002 and 2005 to EUR 1 000 billion in 2009. 
Strongest peak experienced year on year from 2008 to 2009 as the annual volume almost 
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doubled. Despite financial crisis hit the global financial market in 2008 funding from 
international bond market was still available for creditworthy corporates who rushed in to fulfill 
their funding needs. Average issue size at the time increased by 20% from previous year. One 
likely explanation for increased usage of bond financing is unavailability of funding from other 
sources at the time.  
 
In 2010 volume turned downwards and continued to decrease in 2011 as global economy 
struggled in crisis. As a consequence of sovereign debt crisis drop in 2010 was not as drastic as 
one could expect. Investors’ appetite for high credit quality corporate borrowers remained strong 
as part of the demand was shifted from stressed sovereign bond market to corporate bond market 
where underlying issuer credit quality was less contemned.   
 
Figure 3 
Monthly variation of international bond issue volume (USD billion) between 2002 and 2011. This figure shows
monthly amount of international bond issues in USD billion globally in a given month during the period 2002-2011.
Seasonally adjusted values are presented by dashed blue line. Data is gathered from SDC New Issue database. 
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Figure 4 
Proportion of foreign underwriters in international bond issues between 2002 and 2011. This figure shows proportion
underwritten by foreign banks in international bond market during a given year in the period 2002-2011. Data is 
gathered from SDC New Issues database.    
Monthly level issue volume is presented in figure 3. Large variation reflects relatively short 
market windows which are attributable to bond markets as for capital markets in general. When 
macroeconomic outlook is positive market is accessible to relatively larger number of issuers 
whereas during time of increased uncertainty macroeconomic fundamentals push the overall 
volume down. Notable is that volatility has gone up with the volume during the crisis period 
indicating increased importance of market windows. To relieve doubts that change in monthly 
issue volume would be driven by seasonal variations I have also included seasonally adjusted 
path to the figure.    
 
Figure 4 represents fraction of issues underwritten by foreign underwriters at annual level. 
Foreign underwriters share of international bond markets peaked at 71% in 2005 and decreased 
gradually to 55% in 2008. When the volume of international issues peaked in 2009 foreign 
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underwriters were able to recapture their market share. This can be in part explained by 
reputational advantage of large international banks vis a vis local players. Large international 
banks have more extensive distribution network, and hence access to larger pool of investors 
which is advantageous for the issuer looking for larger issue sizes. 
 
In 2010, underwriting share of foreign banks decreased from previous year by 8 percentage 
points to 54%. One explanation for simultaneous downward shift in overall issue volume and 
Figure 5 
Geographical locations of issuers and underwriting banks over time. This figure shows geographical breakdown of
total bond issue and underwriting volume during the sample period. 
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foreign banks’ market share can be drawn from macroeconomic conditions. Consequences of the 
financial crisis were most prevailing in US and UK economies where majority of large 
international banks are domiciled. As crisis hit their home market these banks cut down their 
foreign exposures and concentrated on home markets which they perceived less risky. Interesting 
is that fraction of foreign issues increased again in 2011 whereas the overall volume in the market 
kept going down. 
Figure 5 presents geographical breakdown of total issue and underwriting volume per region at 
annual level during the sample period. It can be seen that proportion of North American issuers 
decreased in the market following the 2008 financial crisis. US issuers have returned to market in 
2010 and 2011 whereas UK players are still at levels which prevailed in 2009. Notable is that 
proportion of underwritings by UK banks have been rather stable over time whereas it seems that 
US banks have suffered to a larger extent from the crisis. In overall it can be seen that amount of 
issues and underwritings from a certain geographic region somewhat follow eachother over time. 
5.5 Main effects 
To assess explanation power of key variables of interest of my study I have included main 
interaction effects of shock and foreign dummy variables relative to Underwriting share 
dependent variable in table 2. Important to note is that these main effects tell little about the 
actual relation between dependent variable and interaction terms used in my regression model. 
They rather give some indication of the effect I will study in my model.      
I find significant decrease on average amount of issues underwritten in foreign markets when 
crisis takes place in bank’s home market. This effect is prominent throughout my results for 
different sub-samples. Notable is that similar effect does not take place at (1) Full sample level 
when looking at average amount of issues underwritten in home market of the bank. This gives 
some indication of increased home bias in distribution of bond issue underwritings when crisis 
takes place at banks home market. No conclusions can be made on course or magnitude of 
changes taking place when crisis hits issuer’s home market.  
I do find significant and negative effects when crisis takes place at issuer’s home market for all 
sub-samples excluding (2) NoUS and UK banks and (4) Listed issuers. Observing such negative 
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relation in conjunction with increased home bias in my regression model would indicate that 
increased home bias for distressed banks is actually driven by demand variations taking place at 
issuer’s home market. However, as I will later show, this is not the case but I rather find existence 
foreign bias for some sub-samples. 
Table 2 
Main interaction effects. Table presents interaction effects of Foreign issue dummy variable on Shock bank and 
Shock issuer dummy variables. Dependent variable is Underwriting share. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All different sub-samples used in this study are presented in order of appearance 
of regression models. 
  
Sample  Interaction terms  Sample mean  Mean diff.  t    No shock  Shock 
(1)  Full sample 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.644  0.635  ‐0.009  ‐0.66 
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country  0.334  0.190  ‐0.143***  ‐22.71 
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country  0.261  0.272  0.011  1.57 
(2)  No UK & US banks 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.717  0.581  ‐0.136***  ‐4.35 
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country  0.383  0.233  ‐0.15***  ‐10.26 
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country  0.318  0.297  ‐0.021  ‐1.41 
(3)  Important markets 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.561  0.718  0.157***  10.06 
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country  0.218  0.176  ‐0.042***  ‐6.17 
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country  0.142  0.217  0.075***  13.50 
(4)  Listed issuers 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.535 0.602 0.066***  4.09
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country 0.280 0.194 ‐0.085***  ‐10.01
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country 0.174 0.252 0.079***  11.71
(5)  Non‐listed issuers 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.430  0.239  ‐0.191***  ‐7.16 
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country  0.224  0.074  ‐0.15***  ‐12.61 
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country  0.127  0.099  ‐0.028***  ‐3.48 
(6)  Government involvment 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.640  0.293  ‐0.347***  ‐5.25 
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country  0.264  0.125  ‐0.139***  ‐6.26 
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country  0.209  0.126  ‐0.083***  ‐3.50 
(7)  Investment grade issues 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.604  0.546  ‐0.058***  ‐3.81 
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country  0.336  0.198  ‐0.138***  ‐19.40 
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country  0.277  0.264  ‐0.013*  ‐1.71 
(8)  High yield issues 
Domestic market ‐ Shock  0.426  0.296  ‐0.131***  ‐2.76 
Foreign market ‐ Shock bank country  0.202  0.118  ‐0.084***  ‐6.29 
Foreign market ‐ Shock issuer country  0.163  0.134  ‐0.029**  ‐2.15 
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6. FINDINGS	AND	ROBUSTNESS	CHECKS	
6.1 Bond underwriter choice and adverse economic conditions 
Existence of home bias in bond issue underwriter choice can be found throughout my results. As 
can be seen from column 1 in table 3 underwriting share per country is lower by 0.27 for banks 
which act as an underwriter outside their home country. Coefficient values for foreign variable 
remain robust throughout my results.  
Table 3 
Home bias and adverse economic conditions. The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 2 is modeled 
using Tobit regression. Column 3 includes issuer home country fixed effects. Column 4 takes into account crisis 
taking place in issuer’s home market. Column 5 includes countries where underwriting bank has had at least 10 
underwriting mandates during the sample period. Column 6 excludes US and UK based banks from the sample. 
Column 7 uses data aggregated at quarterly level. Sample consists of 11 144 bank-country-month observations over 
the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. T values are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not 
presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Tobit 
Issuer 
country FE 
Issuer 
country 
crisis 
Important 
markets 
only 
No US and 
UK banks 
Quarterly 
data   
Foreign issue  ‐0.27***  ‐0.28*** ‐0.29*** ‐0.29*** ‐0.31***  ‐0.35***  ‐0.36***
(‐9.82)  (‐29.11)  (‐10.69)  (‐10.73)  (‐8.8)  (‐8.69)  (‐13.59) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.1***  ‐0.11***  ‐0.08***  ‐0.08**  ‐0.02  ‐0.06  ‐0.07** 
(‐2.68)  (‐7.94)  (‐2.61)  (‐2.29)  (‐0.71)  (‐1.11)  (‐2.04) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country     0.02***     0.00  ‐0.03**  0.01  0.01 
   (3.3)     (‐0.04)  (‐2.01)  (0.19)  (0.83) 
Domestic issues  0.53***  0.5***  0.95***  0.95***  1.14***  0.58***  0.85*** 
(4.48)  (16.67)  (9.51)  (9.38)  (13.67)  (3.7)  (5.2) 
Shock bank country  ‐0.14  ‐0.13***  ‐0.16**  ‐0.16**  ‐0.15**  ‐0.11  ‐0.13* 
(‐1.63)  (‐9.29)  (‐1.98)  (‐2.08)  (‐2.22)  (‐1.15)  (‐1.89) 
Issuer country FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  11 144  11 144 11 144 11 144 8 673  5 792  7 886
R‐squared  0.29  0.47 0.31 0.31 0.39  0.27  0.36
 
Existence of reinforced home bias during adverse economic conditions can be interpreted from 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country variable, negative value indicating that amount of foreign 
issues underwritten by banks experiencing crisis at their home market decreases. From column 1 
in can be seen that proportion of foreign underwriting decreases by 37% when crisis takes place 
in the home market of the bank. Domestic banks have closer ties and better visibility over 
domestic issuers compared to foreign banks. Bank can eventually be very dependent on issuers 
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which come from same home market as these firms are also likely to be the ones which bank has 
most ancillary business. During uncertain times it is in bank’s best interest to allocate its 
resources to home market in order to support relationship with domestic firms that on aggregate 
can be expected to be the ones which are the most profitable for the bank in the long run. 
In column 2, I have constructed my regression using Tobit methodology instead of Ordinary 
Least Squares. As my dependent variable by definition can vary between 0 and 1 use of Tobit 
model would be justified but relatively large amount of control variables I will use in later 
regressions could create problems. For the sake of consistency I will use OLS methodology 
throughout my study. As can be seen from column 2 results using Tobit regression are similar 
with the ones given by OLS.  
Domestic issues variable is positive and statistically significant throughout my results suggesting 
that perceived home bias is not driven by demand variations in the issuer’s home market. 
Insignificant or negative value of Domestic issues variable would suggest that variation in 
domestic issue volume could be explained by local demand shocks, i.e. decreasing total issue 
volume in country j during month t. Clearly this is not the case. To make sure that my results are 
not driven by variation in global issue volume over time I have also included time fixed effects to 
all my regressions.  
In column 3, I include issuer country fixed effects to my model. Together with time fixed effects, 
issuer country fixed effects control for main effects of Foreign issue * Shock issuer country 
variable interaction term same way as Shock bank country regression variable does for Foreign 
issue * Shock bank country interaction term. In some of my regressions Shock bank country 
variable gets a statistically significant negative value indicating that shocks at bank’s home 
country lead to lower underwriting activity in overall for the given bank. When controlling for 
main effects of interaction terms in my model observed variation in home bias decreases by 10 
percentage points to 27%.    
In order to ensure that my results are not driven by shocks taking place in the issuer’s home 
country I have included Foreign issue * Shock issuer country variable to my regression. Negative 
value of the variable would indicate that observed decrease in foreign underwritings would be at 
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least partly explained by decreasing underwriting volume in host markets experiencing crisis 
simultaneously with bank’s home market. As suggested by Epstein (2001) in his paper on 
ambiguity aversion explanation of home bias bank experiencing a crisis at its host market would 
decrease its exposure to that market due to increased risk perception caused by its impaired 
ability to evaluate issuers in that market. As shown in column 4, I find no evidence of such effect. 
In column 5 I have included only issues from countries where the bank has underwritten at least 
10 issues during the sample period. Although there is clear home bias of around 0.31 for 
domestic issues in general I find no increase in home bias during crisis at bank’s home market. 
Here the Foreign issue * Shock issuer country variable gets negative and statistically significant 
value indicating that banks decrease their exposure to markets where uncertainty increases. 
Intuitively one could argue that this would be more probable in markets where bank is less active, 
i.e. in countries where bank has had below 10 underwritings during the sample period. This 
seems not to be the case. It shows that my results are somewhat driven by shocks taking place at 
bank’s host markets. However, in some of my later regressions I find this variable to be positive 
and statistically significant indicating that banks increase proportion of foreign underwritings in 
markets where uncertainty increases.        
To relieve possible problems caused by dominance of US and UK banks I have excluded banks 
domiciled in these countries from my sample in column 6. This cuts my sample size by almost 
50% and turns Foreign issue * Shock bank country variable insignificant. Consequently, my 
results are somewhat driven by US and UK banks. It seems that although there is home bias in 
general for banks outside US and UK they do not withdraw their foreign underwriting resources 
when hit by crisis at home. One possible explanation is that these banks regard US and UK 
markets to be safe haven, hence promoting existence of bias towards US and UK markets during 
uncertain times. This is consistent with flight to quality explanation which I discuss more in 
detail in the following section. 
To reduce concerns that my results would be driven by previously observed large variation in 
monthly issue volume I have reconstructed the data on quarterly basis in column 7. The results 
remain robust showing that increased home bias is not explained by banks’ tendency to enter 
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foreign markets during months when issue volume is high, and exit respectively when the 
monthly volume is low.   
Table 4 
Home bias and different issuer types.  The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 1 shows results when 
dependent variable is constructed using listed issuers only. Column 2 considers only non-listed issuers. Column 3 
represents results where only issues by issuers that are wholly or partially government owned are considered.   
Sample consists of 11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable 
definitions. T values are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Listed issuers  Non‐listed issuers  Government owned issuers   
Foreign issue  ‐0.24***  ‐0.21***  ‐0.29*** 
(‐9)  (‐6.2)  (‐5.13) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.08** ‐0.01  ‐0.01
(‐1.98) (‐0.35)  (‐0.12)
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  0.01 0.02  0.01
(0.41) (0.58)  (0.17)
Domestic listed issuers  0.84***       
   6.23       
Domestic non‐listed issuers     0.85***    
   (4.04)    
Domestic government owned issuers        3.2*** 
      (3.41) 
Shock bank country  ‐0.16**  ‐0.29***  ‐0.21 
(‐2.11)  (‐3.04)  (‐1.51) 
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  8 699  3 766  1 527 
R‐squared  0.27  0.28  0.36 
 
 
Table 4 represents regression results for different issuer types. Results remain qualitatively 
similar for listed issuers presented in column 1. For two other sub-samples I find no change in 
level of home bias when crisis takes place either in bank’s home or host market, indicating that 
observed increase in home bias is somewhat driven by increased preference for domestic listed 
issuers which on aggregate are more transparent compared to non-listed issuers. Interestingly, 
value of Foreign issue variable is smaller for non-listed issuers than listed or government owned 
issuers. In line with classical net certification hypothesis of Booth and Smith (1986), non-listed 
issuers being in principle less transparent than listed issuers are more dependent on large foreign 
banks when raising funds from international bond markets. These banks are more credible 
certifiers from foreign investors’ point of view compared to domestic underwriters. Relatively 
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highest home bias found for government owned issuers suggests that domestic banks perceive 
underlying credit quality differently for these issuers compared to foreign banks. Moreover, 
government owned firms, especially if they are under tight control of government itself, might 
want to allocate issue mandates towards domestic banks in order to boost domestic economy.    
6.2 Flight-to-quality explanations 
So far I have shown that home bias in distribution of bond underwriting mandates increases when 
crisis hits the home market of the underwriting bank. However, it is possible that observed 
increase in home bias is actually a reflection of some other source driving underwriting activity 
towards home markets. One possibility is that underwriting banks reallocate their origination and 
execution resources to issues which they perceive to be of higher quality. Next I will assess 
whether my results hold when controlling for the underlying credit quality. 
To see if observed home bias is simply consequence of banks’ withdrawal from host markets 
which are hit by crisis, and hence perceived to be riskier, I have excluded such observations from 
my model in column 1 in table 5. This seems not to be the case as my results remain similar even 
when only healthy host markets are taken into account. To further assess influence of host market 
credit quality I have included Emerging markets dummy variable to my model. Distinct treatment 
of issuers coming from emerging and advanced markets would signal that my results are driven 
by flight-to-quality rather than home bias. As can be seen from column 2 this is not the case. 
Emerging market status seems to increase home bias in general as suggested by negative and 
statistically significant value of Emerging market * Foreign issue coefficient but no increase is 
observed when shock takes place in bank’s home country. Similarly, I don’t find evidence of 
shift towards home markets when crisis takes place in foreign emerging market.  
In column 3 and 4 I have split my data according to issuer’s underlying credit quality.  
Interestingly home bias for high yield issuers is found to be smaller than for investment grade 
issuers in general. Again, this promotes existence of net certification role of foreign banks. When 
shock takes place in bank’s home market, home bias in distribution of investment grade issuers’ 
underwriting mandates increases by 27%, a figure which is equal to one observed for the whole 
sample. I find no statistically significant change for high yield issuers. Notable is that Foreign 
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issue * Shock issuer country for high yield issuers is positive and statistically significant, 
promoting existence of foreign bias towards lower credit quality issuers when hit by crisis at their 
home market.  
Table 5 
Issuer credit quality. The dependent variable is underwriting share.  Column 1 represents results when issues from 
host countries under crisis are excluded from the sample. Column 2 includes emerging market dummy variable. 
Column 3 considers only issues by investment grade issuers. Column 4 considers only issues by high yield issuers. 
Sample consists of 11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable 
definitions. T values are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Non crisis 
host 
countries 
Emerging 
market 
Investment 
Grade 
issues 
High Yield 
issues   
Foreign issue  ‐0.29***  ‐0.27***  ‐0.26***  ‐0.18*** 
(‐10.34)  (‐10.16)  (‐8.74)  (‐3.36) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.28***  ‐0.11***  ‐0.07*  ‐0.08 
(‐3.1)  (‐2.64)  (‐1.82)  (‐1.41) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country     0.00  0.02  0.06* 
   (0.26)  (0.79)  (1.7) 
Domestic issues  0.81***  0.94***  ‐0.22  ‐0.29 
(6.53)  (9.37)  (‐1.33)  (‐0.45) 
Shock bank country     ‐0.14*  ‐0.17**  ‐0.13 
   (‐1.81)  (‐2.15)  (‐1.49) 
Emerging market     0.29***       
   (3.37)       
Emerging market * Foreign issue     ‐0.36***       
   (‐4.54)       
Emerging market * Foreign issue * Shock bank country     0.04       
   (1.2)       
Emerging market * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country ‐0.08   
(‐1.25)   
Domestic Investment Grade issues  1.14*** 
      (6.06)    
Domestic High Yield issues           4.35** 
         (2.41) 
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  6 884  11 102  9 023  1 499 
R‐squared  0.30  0.32  0.26  0.31 
 
In order to assess development of financial markets beyond distinction made between emerging 
markets and developed markets I have split my sample using set of proxies to measure level of 
institutional development in bank’s home and host market. In column 1 of table 6, I have 
constructed my sample using proxy of quality and accessibility of credit information in issuer’s 
home market by including Credit information control variable. Results support my earlier 
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findings. I find higher degree of home bias for issuers which come from markets where 
availability of credit information is low. However, the effect is not found to be more pronounced 
when crisis takes place in bank’s home market. Negative and statistically significant value of 
Credit information * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country variable indicates that increase in 
bank’s home bias is more pronounced in foreign markets where availability of credit information 
is low. 
In column 2, I control for strength of legal rights in home country of the issuer. As found with 
availability of credit information there is stronger home bias in general when legal environment 
in the home country the issuer is weaker. I find no variation in home bias when crisis hits banks 
home market but I observe increased withdrawal from distressed markets where legal protection 
is low. These findings suggest that banks shift their underwriting portfolio towards markets 
where institutions are strong when perceiving increased uncertainty at their host markets. 
However, this flight-to-quality effect does not help to explain the observed home bias when bank 
experiences a crisis at its home market. This, together with my earlier observation of increased 
foreign bias for high yield issuers, indicates that banks experiencing a crisis at their host markets 
shift their underwriting portfolio towards lower quality names but only if these issuers are from 
markets where institutional protection in general is high.   
In order to assess whether strong legislation in bank’s home market could explain pronounced 
home bias during crisis periods I have included strength of legal rights in home country of the 
underwriting bank to my model. Banks from strong legal environments withdrawing their foreign 
exposures more than banks coming from countries where legal protection is low would indicate 
that that flight-to-quality explanation carries some explanative power over my results. This would 
not abolish flight-home explanation of my results as such but would rather indicate that there is 
some interrelation between the two.  
47 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Market specific traits. The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 1 and 2 include depth of credit information 
and strength of legal rights dummy variable from World Bank’s Doing Business database at issuer’s home market (low 
value indicating more availability of information and stronger legal protection). Column 3 controls for legal rights at bank’s 
home market. Column 4 includes difference in sovereign rating between the underwriting bank’s and issuer’s home country. 
Column 5 considers issuer home country’s stock market size relative to Gross Domestic Product. Sample consists of 11 144 
bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. T values are presented in 
parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the bank level; *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  
Credit 
information
Legal 
rights 
Sovereign 
rating 
Stock 
market 
size of 
GDP 
  
Legal 
rights 
bank 
     
Foreign issue  ‐0.17***  0.00  ‐0.28***  ‐0.29***  ‐0.53*** 
(‐2.62)  (‐0.14)  (‐9.69)  (‐11.06)  (‐9.33) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.08  ‐0.17**  ‐0.09**  ‐0.06  0 
(‐0.93)  (‐2.16)  (‐2.42)  (‐1.6)  (‐0.08) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  0.05**  0.03  0  0.00  0 
(1.96)  (0.97)  (‐0.07)  (‐0.17)  (‐0.14) 
Domestic issues  0.92***  0.87***  0.88***  0.94***  0.96*** 
(7.88)  (7.44)  (7.91)  (9.27)  (8.92) 
Shock bank country  ‐0.18**  ‐0.07  ‐0.1  ‐0.15**  ‐0.19** 
(‐2.28)  (‐0.63)  (‐1.24)  (‐1.99)  (‐2.16) 
Credit information  0.08***             
(2.58)             
Credit information * Foreign issue   ‐0.09***             
(‐2.6)      
Credit information * Foreign issue * Shock bank country 0.01      
(0.44)      
Credit information * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  ‐0.02**             
(‐2.55)             
Credit information * Shock bank country  0.00             
(0.00)             
Legal rights      0.08***          
   (4.17)          
Legal rights * Foreign issue      ‐0.08***          
   (‐4.22)          
Legal rights * Foreign issue * Shock bank country     0.02          
   (1.28)          
Legal rights * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country     0.00          
   (‐1.13)          
Legal rights * Shock bank country     ‐0.01          
   (‐0.91)          
Legal rights bank        ‐0.02**       
      (‐2.12)       
Legal rights bank * Foreign issue        0.00       
      (‐0.75)       
Legal rights bank * Foreign issue * Shock bank country        0.00       
      (‐0.34)       
Legal rights bank * Shock bank country        0.00       
      (0.22)       
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Table 6 (continued) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
   Credit information
Legal 
rights 
Legal 
rights 
bank 
Sovereign 
rating 
Stock 
market 
size of 
GDP 
S&P rating issuer home country           0.01    
           (‐1.38)    
(S&P rating bank‐S&P rating issuer) * Foreign issue * Shock bank country          0.01***    
     (2.59) 
(S&P rating bank‐S&P rating issuer) * Foreign issue * Shock issuer 
country 
   0.02*** 
   (4.23) 
Issuer home country stock market size of GDP              ‐0.18*** 
            (‐6.21) 
Issuer home country stock market size of GDP * Foreign issue              0.21*** 
            (6.13) 
Issuer home country stock market size of GDP * Foreign issue * Shock 
bank country 
            ‐0.02 
            (‐0.42) 
Issuer home country stock market size of GDP * Foreign issue * Shock 
issuer country 
            0.01 
            (0.46) 
Issuer home country stock market size of GDP * Shock bank country              ‐0.02             (‐0.39) 
  
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  8 441  8 441  8 602  11 032  10 988 
R‐squared  0.37  0.39  0.33  0.33  0.34 
  
 
 
Results in column 3 show that proportion of foreign issues in general is not higher for banks 
which come from countries where legislative protection is lower. Negative value of Legal rights 
bank * Foreign issue * Shock bank country would indicate that the home bias during crisis is 
more pronounced for banks who come from markets with stronger legal rights. I find no 
statistically significant evidence of such effect.  
In column 4 I have added sovereign rating of the issuer’s home country and its difference 
compared to sovereign rating of bank’s home country as a control variable. I find no evidence 
that bank’s underwriting portfolio would be in general more pronounced towards issuers coming 
from countries where sovereign credit quality is high. When bank’s home country experiences a 
banking crisis, bank seem to withdraw less from markets where sovereign credit rating is higher 
than the one in their home market. Same effect prevails when financial turmoil takes place in 
issuer’s home market. Results indicate that flight-to-quality effect explains the earlier observed 
increase in home bias to some extent.  
Size of national stock market can be considered to serve as a proxy for importance of domestic 
capital market in general. Large size of stock markets in issuer’s home country indicates that 
capital markets are important source of funding for firms domiciled in the country. Larger 
markets can also be seen to be more liquid and efficient, ceteris paribus. In order to see if banks 
shift their underwritings towards issuers coming from countries where capital markets are 
relatively more important I have included stock market size relative to GDP variable to my 
model. Results are presented in column 5. There is bias towards issuers coming from markets 
where relative size of the stock market is large as coefficient Issuer home country stock market 
size of GDP * Foreign issue is positive and statistically significant. However, I find no 
statistically significant change in bank’s home bias when it experiences a crisis either at its home 
or host market.             
6.3 Issuer-bank specific traits 
Next I will assess how much the observed increase in home bias can be explained by issuer and 
bank specific traits. Results are shown in table 7. Column 1 includes Large issuer dummy 
variable indicating whether average amount of issuer’s total assets underwritten by bank j are 
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above the average amount for issuers during the sample period. Number of observations in my 
sample is limited to 6 541 as balance sheet data is not available for all issuers. I expect that issue 
size increases with issuer’s size as it is reasonable that foreign banks with more extensive 
distribution network have larger proportion of large issuers in their portfolio. However, I find no 
evidence that large issuers would be treated or act differently either in general or during the crisis. 
In accordance with flight-to-quality effect it can be argued that large issuers would be perceived 
to be less risky during crisis as there is on average more information available on them and their 
probability to go bankruptcy is lower compared to smaller issuers. I find no evidence of such 
effect. 
In column 2, I have included bank’s total amount of underwriting mandates during the prior year 
relative to overall issue volume in the market as a control variable. If prior performance serves as 
a reputation driver, banks with relatively larger share of underwritings in the past should attain 
more underwriting mandates in the present. I find positive relation between amount of past 
underwriting activity and foreign bias. However, I find no evidence that bank’s past performance 
would enable it to receive more underwritings during crisis. To assess how dominance of US and 
UK banks, which have traditionally been on top of league tables, affects my findings I have 
excluded these banks from my sample in column 3. My results remain similar to what was 
observed for the full sample.  
Column 4 presents results for first time issuers. Issuer raising money first time from the bond 
market can be expected to be more exposed to asymmetric information than issuers who have 
visited the market before. Home bias in general is slightly below the one observed for the whole 
sample. This further supports my earlier observation of certification role that foreign banks have. 
As first time issuers are more pronounced to information asymmetry they are likely to employ 
foreign underwriters which are distant enough to alleviate information asymmetries between the 
issuer and investors. Notable is that foreign banks certification role gain more importance during 
crisis as indicated by positive and statistically significant Foreign issue * Shock issuer country 
variable. I find no evidence of increased home bias during crisis at bank’s home market.   
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Table 7 
Issuer and bank specific traits. The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 1 includes large issuer dummy 
indicating whether average size of issuers underwritten by a given bank are above the average issuer size during the 
sample period. Column 2 includes total amount of issues underwritten by a given bank during the prior 12 months. 
Column 3 excludes US and UK banks when considering the prior underwritten volume by a given bank. Column 4 
represents results when only issuers raising money for the first time from international bond market are during 1997-
2011 are considered. Sample consists of 11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See 
table 1 for variable definitions. T values are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Large 
issuer 
League 
table 
position 
League 
table (no 
US and UK 
banks) 
First time 
issues   
Foreign issue  ‐0.31***  ‐0.25***  ‐0.26***  ‐0.21*** 
(‐10.62)  (‐7.91)  (‐7.1)  (‐8.04) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.1**  ‐0.07*  ‐0.1**  ‐0.03 
(‐2.27)  (‐1.9)  (‐2.23)  (‐0.84) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.04* 
(1.23)  (‐0.44)  (‐0.46)  (1.67) 
Domestic issues  1.01***  0.92***  0.62***    
(9.74)  (9.36)  (4.59)    
Shock bank country  ‐0.12  ‐0.07  ‐0.04  ‐0.28*** 
(‐1.59)  (‐1.59)  (‐1.01)  (‐3.67) 
Large issuer  0.00          
(0.21)          
Large issuer * Foreign issue  0.04          
(1.14)          
Large issuer * Foreign issue * Shock bank country  0.00          
(‐0.08)          
Large issuer * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  0.03          
(1.1)          
Large issuer * Shock bank country  ‐0.03          
(‐0.62)   
League table position  ‐2.57***  ‐4.12*** 
(‐7.41) (‐8.48) 
League table position * Foreign issue  0.53**  1.3*** 
   (2.37)  (6.27)    
League table position * Foreign issue * Shock bank country     ‐0.14  ‐0.08    
   (‐0.85)  (‐0.32)    
League table position * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country     ‐0.02  0.07    
   (‐0.13)  (0.49)    
League table position * Shock bank country     1.03***  1.35***    
   (4.44)  (5.59)    
Domestic first time issues           1.07*** 
         (5.72) 
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  6 541 11 144  5 792  4 686
R‐squared  0.39 0.56 0.55  0.28
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In columns 1 to 3 of table 8, I have split my sample according to issuer’s previous bond issues 
and past relationship with the underwriting bank. In column 1, I limit my sample to issuers for 
whom the bank is acting as an underwriter for the first time during the past five years. 
Interestingly, I found that banks are biased towards foreign markets. According to Foreign issue 
variable bank’s underwriting portfolio is higher by 0.05 in case of foreign issuers. When bank 
experiences a crisis at its home market, this effect accelerates further as indicated by positive 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country variable. There are at least two plausible explanations. 
Firstly, as discussed in case of first time issuers foreign banks are preferred as underwriters 
because of their enhanced certification capability compared to domestic underwriters. Secondly, 
bank experiencing a crisis at its home market is keen to look for business outside its home land. 
Opening new relationships with foreign issuers enables bank to diversify its exposure away from 
its home market where riskiness increases following the crisis. This does not contradict with 
earlier observed increase in home bias but shows that bank’s re-allocate their risk positions 
following the crisis. 
When limiting my sample to issuers from whom the bank has received an underwriting mandate 
during the past five years, I find home bias below level observed for the whole sample. Same 
applies for sub-sample where I include only issuers for whom the bank has lent money during the 
prior five years. I find no evidence that past relationship, either in form of prior underwriting 
mandate or direct lending would lead to variation in home bias during crisis. These results 
indicate that past relationship alleviates earlier observed increase in home bias to some extent.  
Past lending relationship enhances bank’s ability to gain underwriting mandates, and hence 
alleviates increase in home bias during crisis.  Lending relationship incentives bank to monitor 
the borrower and leads to economies of scope when competing on underwriting mandates. On 
aggregate, this increases bank’s profitability and incentives it to underwrite issues by firms to 
whom it has lent money in the past. When hit by crisis banks are forced to adapt their operations 
which is likely to lead to cut in least profitable relationships. Hence, banks are expected to cut 
bond origination efforts least in areas where they perceive the highest profitability potential, i.e. 
among their lenders. If bank lends money outside its domestic market it is fair to expect that 
increase in home bias during crisis is be less pronounced among its lenders.  
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Table 8 
Past relationship. The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 1 considers only issues by issuers for whom 
the underwriting bank has not acted as an underwriter during the past five years. Column 2 considers issues by 
issuers that the bank has acted as an underwriter during the past five years. Column 3 represents results when only 
issues by issuers for whom the underwriting bank has lent money during the past five years. Column 4 considers 
number of countries where a given bank has acted as an underwriter during the prior 12 months. Sample consists of 
11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. T values 
are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Non 
relationship 
issuer 
Issue 
relationship 
Loan 
relationship  Diversification    
Foreign issue  0.05***  ‐0.14***  ‐0.18***  ‐0.22*** 
(3.46)  (‐4.21)  (‐6.63)  (‐7.95) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  0.07***  ‐0.03  0.00  ‐0.05 
(2.96)  (‐1.03)  (‐0.11)  (‐1.56) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  0.00  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.04 
(‐0.35)  (‐1.44)  (‐0.77)  (‐1.34) 
Domestic issues           0.88*** 
         (8.54) 
Shock bank country  ‐0.11***  ‐0.15**  ‐0.19***  ‐0.08*** 
(‐4.78)  (‐2.43)  (‐3.02)  (‐2.86) 
Domestic non‐bond relationship issues  0.23**          
(2.14)          
Domestic bond relationship issues     1.16***       
   (8.09)       
Domestic loan relationship issues        1.5***    
(7.41) 
Diversification     ‐0.02***
   (‐14.84)
Diversification * Foreign issue           0*** 
         (2.91) 
Diversification * Foreign issue * Shock bank country           0.00 
         (‐1.23) 
Diversification * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country           0.00 
         (1.08) 
Diversification * Shock bank country           0.01*** 
         (4.73) 
  
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  7 979  5 155  3 070  11 144 
R‐squared  0.24  0.22  0.29  0.60 
 
To assess to what extend my results are affected by bank’s geographical diversification I have 
included amount of countries where bank has had an underwriting mandate during prior 12 
months as a control variable. Larger the diversification, lower should be the increase in home bias 
during crisis. Banks that have diversified their business can be expected to be less exposed to 
local shocks. Results presented in column 4 indicate that more diversified banks have higher 
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proportion of foreign issues in their underwriting portfolio. However, I find no evidence that 
more diversified banks would be less pronounced to increase their level of home bias during 
crisis.  
6.4 Familiarity traits and variation in home bias 
My previous results show that power of flight-to-quality or set of issuer and bank specific traits 
are not adequate to explain the increase in home bias. In order to test how much familiarity 
considerations explain the perceived change I have included set of variables to control for 
similarities in issuer’s and bank’s cultural and national traits as well as geographical proximity 
and bilateral investment between their home countries. 
In the first column of table 9 I have included proportion of bilateral investment from the bank’s 
home country to the issuer’s home country during the year of the issue as a control variable. I 
assume that if bank experiences a crisis at home it will withdraw to lesser extent from more 
familiar markets. There is positive relation between bank’s underwriting share and investment 
flow from bank’s home country to issuer’s country as shown by positive and statistically 
significant Direct investment variable. Results are, however, insignificant when interacting Shock 
issuer and Shock bank country variables with Direct investment, indicating that proportion of 
direct investment from home country of the bank to the host economy does not affect bank’s 
behavior during crisis. 
In column 2, I control for geographical distance between the issuer’s and underwriting bank’s 
home market. Expectation is that amount of familiarity factors between issuer and underwriting 
bank decreases with distance. I find no evidence that geographically less distant foreign issuers 
would be preferable in bank’s underwriting portfolio as such. When shock takes place in issuer’s 
home market more distant banks are able to increase their underwriting share. Foreign banks are 
able to bring in new pool of foreign investors through their distribution capability which still 
have risk appetite compared to geographically proximate investors who are likely to become 
more risk averse following the crisis. It is good to bear in mind that investors’ risk appetite is in 
the end the factor which determines the price which the issuer has to pay for the capital. 
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Underwriting bank that is able to bring in distant investors who perceive issuer’s risk to be lower 
than proximate investors is pushing down issuer’s cost of capital. 
When shock takes place at bank’s home market, I find positive relation between distance and 
increase in home bias. This suggests that bank’s preference for more proximate and familiar 
issuers increase with uncertainty at bank’s home market. Same results hold at both shock bank 
and shock issuer country level when I include only Investment Grade level issuers to my model. 
When limiting my sample to High Yield issues in column 4 I keep finding positive relation 
between the distance and shock bank country interaction but I find no inverse relation when 
shock takes place at issuer’s home market. This is in line with my earlier observations for High 
Yield level issuers and indicates that banks increase their underwriting proportion in distant 
distressed markets only for more creditworthy issuers. Equivalent magnitude of increase in home 
bias for more distant players at different sub-samples when negative shock takes place at bank’s 
home market shows that banks do not treat issuers differently according to their credit quality. 
This supports my conjecture that familiarity reasons explain shift in home bias to some extent. 
Universal shift towards more proximate and hence familiar issuers indicates increase in bank’s 
effective risk aversion when experiencing negative shock at home.        
 
  
 
 
Table 9 
Familiarity measures. The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 1 includes proportion of direct investment from 
bank’s home economy to issuer’s home country as reported by IMF’s Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey. Column 2 controls 
for the distance between the capital cities of bank and issuer home countries. Columns 3 and 4 control for the distance for 
Investment Grade and High Yield level issuers, respectively. Column 3 includes amount of issues in domestic currency of the bank 
in a given country during the prior 12 months. Sample consists of 11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-
2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. T values are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Bilateral 
investment Distance 
Distance  
IG issues 
Distance 
HY issues 
Currency 
composition  
Foreign issue     ‐0.24*  ‐0.29*  ‐0.32**  ‐0.36*** 
   (‐1.75)  (‐1.94)  (‐2.06)  (‐7.51) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country     0.33***  0.55***  0.27*  0.03 
   (2.96)  (3.54)  (1.67)  (0.29) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country     ‐0.27**  ‐0.49***  0.02  ‐0.04* 
   (‐2.5)  (‐3.28)  (0.12)  (‐1.92) 
Domestic issues  0.56*  0.96***        0.96*** 
(‐1.85)  (10.26)        (10.68) 
Domestic Investment Grade issues  0.93***    
(8.68)    
Doemstic High Yield issues     3.89**
   (2.3) 
Shock bank country  ‐0.17  ‐0.16**  ‐0.16**  ‐0.14  ‐0.28* 
(‐0.71)  (‐2.11)  (‐2.17)  (‐1.6)  (‐1.88) 
Shock issuer country  ‐0.01***             
(3.94)             
Diret investment  0.64***             
(3.6)             
Direct investment * Shock bank country  0.12             
(0.43)             
Direct investment * Shock issuer country  0.04             
(0.2)             
Distance      0.01  0.00  0.01    
   (‐0.31)  (0.22)  (0.82)    
Distance * Shock bank country     ‐0.05***  ‐0.07***  ‐0.04*    
   (‐3.4)  (‐3.83)  (‐1.85)    
Distance * Shock issuer country     0.03**  0.06***  0.00    
   (2.31)  (3.32)  (0.12)    
Proportion issues in domestic currency              ‐0.17** 
            (‐2.26) 
Proportion issues in domestic currency * Foreign issue              0.08 
            (1.13) 
Proportion issues in domestic currency * Foreign issue * Shock bank country              ‐0.18 
            (‐1.22) 
Proportion issues in domestic currency * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country             0.18** 
            (2.3) 
Proportion issues in domestic currency * Shock bank country       0.21
      (1.48)
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  7 331  11 046  8 960  1 463  10 900 
R‐squared  0.21  0.32  0.27  0.32  0.33 
  
 
 
In order to evaluate how much of the shift in home bias can be attributed to currency composition 
of the issue I include proportion of issues that has been underwritten in bank’s domestic currency 
in the given country during the prior 12 months as a control variable. During a crisis bank might 
want to decrease its foreign exchange risk by preferring issues in its domestic currency. I find no 
evidence of increased home bias when shock takes place at bank’s home market. When crisis hits 
issuer’s home market, bank’s foreign bias increases with proportion of prior issues nominated in 
banks domestic currency in that market. Banks on average are likely to have more dedicated 
foreign exchange research in their home currencies. When uncertainty increases in the host 
market banks from the same currency area gain competitive advantage over others banks, and are 
hence able to increase their market share. 
In column 1 of table 10, I include Common currency dummy to my model. Results remain similar 
when shock takes place at issuer’s home market. There is no evidence of home bias in general but 
negative and statistically significant value of Common currency * Foreign issue * Shock bank 
country coefficient indicates that banks decrease their exposure to foreign issuers within the 
common currency area when crisis takes place at their home market. Bank experiencing a crisis 
at its home market is vulnerable to foreign exchange risk as it is likely that the crisis leads also to 
impairment of the bank’s home currency. Countries sharing the same currency are likely to be 
exposed to crisis as well which limits issues from the same currency area in general. In order to 
limit its exposure to the crisis bank seeks to increase proportion of underwritings in foreign 
currencies. However, as observed before, when shock takes place at host market within the same 
currency area bank is able to increase its proportion of issues in that market.  
To study further relevance of familiarity factors in banks underwriting behavior I have included 
common language, religion and legal system dummy variables to my model. Home bias relieves 
when foreign issuer and underwriting bank share a common language as indicated by positive 
value of Common language * Foreign issue variable. I find no evidence that banks’ preference to 
underwrite issuers from common language area would grow when crisis takes place either in 
bank’s or issuer’s home market. I find similar results when including Common legal system 
variable to my model in column 3. As can be seen from column 4 religion dummy has no 
statistical power in my model.  
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Table 10 
Common characteristics. The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 1 includes dummy variable 
indicating if bank has common home currency with the issuer. Column 2 controls for common language. Column 3 
includes dummy variable indicating whether bank and issuer have similar prevailing legal system in their home 
countries. Column 4 controls for common religion between the bank and issuer’s home country. Sample consists of 
11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. T values 
are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Currency  Language  Legal system  Religion   
Foreign issue  ‐0.29*** ‐0.31*** ‐0.29***  ‐0.28***
(‐10.1) (‐11.38) (‐10.31)  (‐9.88)
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.08**  ‐0.08**  ‐0.09***  ‐0.11*** 
(‐2.34)  (‐2.1)  (‐2.7)  (‐2.87) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  ‐0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00 
(‐1.4)  (0.68)  (‐0.02)  (‐0.05) 
Domestic issues  0.96***  0.95***  0.99***  0.99*** 
(9.73)  (9.42)  (10.93)  (10.82) 
Shock bank  ‐0.17**  ‐0.16**  ‐0.15*  ‐0.14* 
(‐2.17)  (‐2.16)  (‐1.87)  (‐1.84) 
Common currency * Foreign issue  0.06        0.03 
(0.83)        (1.45) 
Common currency * Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.33***        0.05 
(‐2.62)        (1.14) 
Common currency * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  0.41***        ‐0.02 
(3.41)        (‐0.61) 
Common language * Foreign issue     0.06*       
   (1.82)       
Common language * Foreign issue * Shock bank country     0.00       
   (0.08)       
Common language * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country     ‐0.05       
   (‐1.33)       
Common legal system * Foreign issue        0.06**    
      (2.52)    
Common legal system * Foreign issue * Shock bank country        0.03    
      (0.93)    
Common legal system * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country        ‐0.01    
(‐0.54) 
Common religion * Foreign issue     0.03
   (1.45)
Common religion * Foreign issue * Shock bank country    0.05
         (1.14) 
Common religion * Foreign issue * Shock issuer country           ‐0.02 
         (‐0.61) 
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  11 140  11 144  10 170  10 170 
R‐squared  0.33  0.32  0.33  0.32 
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6.5 Robustness checks 
In order to test that my results are not driven by underlying differences between domestic and 
foreign issuers I have included variables to control for average contract terms of issues 
underwritten by each bank in the given market during preceding 12 months. Results presented in 
table 10 shows that increased home bias remains. To test if observed increase in home bias 
during crisis is a consequence of larger issue size of foreign transactions in general I have 
included Average issue amount variable to my model in column 1. If issue sizes are relatively 
larger for foreign issuers, increased home bias would be at least partly explained by relatively 
bigger drop in issue volumes of large issues during crisis. Statistically significant Average issue 
amount variable suggests that prior issue volume has some explanatory power in my model.  
In column 2, I have added variables to control for average gross spread and average maturity of 
the transactions during the prior 12 months. Statistically significant Average maturity variable 
indicates that maturities of prior issues underwritten by a bank i in the given country explain my 
findings to some extent. I fail to find evidence of increased home bias during crisis indicating that 
my results are somewhat driven by difference in underlying characteristics between domestic and 
foreign issuers. Moreover, I find negative and statistically significant values for Foreign issue * 
Shock issuer country variable indicating that foreign demand shocks have some influence on my 
findings. 
Table 12 presents results when using alternative measures to control for the increased uncertainty 
in the bank’s and the issuer’s home country. In column 1, I use monthly stock market 
performance in home country of the bank and the issuer as an alternative measure for crisis. 
Stock market performance both, in the home country of the bank and the issuer is eligible 
measure of shock. This shows that banking crisis measure which I use throughout my study is 
robust measure of market sentiment in general.    
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Table 11 
Contract terms. The dependent variable is underwriting share. Column 1 controls for the average amount of issues 
underwritten by bank i in country j during the prior 12 months. In column 2, I include issue amount, gross spread and 
maturity to control for the average contract terms offered by a bank i during prior 12 months in each country. Sample 
consists of 11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. 
T values are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
   (1)  (2) 
Issue amount  Contract terms   
Foreign issue  ‐0.29***  ‐0.25*** 
(‐9.36)  (‐7.13) 
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.05  0.03 
(‐1.37)  (0.98) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  ‐0.02  ‐0.1*** 
  (‐1.18)  (‐3.64) 
Domestic issues  1.02***  1.15***
(11.31)  (11.78)
Shock bank country  ‐0.15**  ‐0.24***
(‐2.2)  (‐3.33)
Average issue amount (USD '000)  ‐0.00***  ‐0.24 
(‐3.49)  (‐1.49) 
Average gross spread (%)     0.03 
   (1.24) 
Average maturity (years)     ‐0.01*** 
   (‐3.39) 
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  8 861  4 920 
R‐squared  0.38  0.41 
 
 
To assess how importance of the bond market in the given country relative to global bond market 
influences the observed increase in home bias I have included Bias as an alternative dependent 
variable to my model in column 2. If there is no home bias in distribution of underwriting 
mandates banks would be expected to have their underwriting portfolio allocated globally 
according to importance of national capital markets relative to each other. Increase home bias in 
this context would be reflected as a positive value of Foreign issue * Shock bank country 
variable. According to my results, home bias increases by 60% when bank experiences a crisis at 
its home market, a figure which is significantly higher compared to 27% in my initial model. 
Correspondingly, when shock takes place at the issuer’s home market bank’s foreign bias 
increases by over 50%. These results support my earlier findings and show that my results cannot 
be explained by relative importance of some countries compared to others. 
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Table 12 
Alternative measures. The dependent variable is underwriting share with the exception of column 2 where the 
dependent variable is Bias measuring home bias in the underwriting portfolio of bank i in country j as defined by 
Ahearne et al (2004). In column 1, I have used monthly performance of stock market in home country of the bank 
and the issuer to control for increased uncertainty in the market respectively. In column 2, I use Bias as a dependent 
variable, computed as one minus the ratio of the underwriting share to the total amount of issues in that market 
relative to global issue volume at time t. Sample consists of 11 144 bank-country-month observations over the period 
2002-2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. T values are presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively.   
   (1)  (2) 
Stock returns  Bias   
Foreign issue  ‐0.33***  30.05*** 
(‐11.62)  (4.83) 
Market return in bank country  ‐0.23    
(‐1.25)    
Foreign issue * Market return in bank country  0.38*    
(1.77)    
Foreign issue * Market return in issuer country  ‐0.16*    
(‐1.65)    
Domestic issues  1.02***    
(9.73)    
Foreign issue * Shock bank country     18.03* 
   (1.88) 
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  ‐15.48**
  (‐2.57)
Shock bank country  15.25
   (0.98) 
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  10 397  11 144 
R‐squared  0.28  0.13 
 
To make sure that my results are not explained by differences in syndicate composition during 
normal times and crisis I have included controls for structure of the underwriting syndication in 
table 13. In column 1, I use number of issues instead of underwriting amount as a dependent 
variable. I keep finding statistically significant increase in home bias with a similar magnitude 
compared to my initial findings. This clearly shows that my results are not driven by change in 
number of issues the bank is able to attain in domestic versus foreign markets.  
In column 2, I use average number of participants in issues where given bank acted as an 
underwriter as a dependent variable. Results show that foreign issues have larger underwriting 
syndication in general. I find no change in average number of underwriting banks for foreign 
issues when bank experiences a crisis at its home market. When shock takes place at the issuer’s 
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home market I find increase in number of underwriting banks used in the deal. This is in line with 
my earlier observation of increased certification for foreign distressed issuers. Large underwriting 
group is likely to have on average more certification power than a small underwriting group.    
Table 13 
Syndicate composition. In column 1, the dependent variable is number of issues bank has underwritten during time t 
in country j relative to total number of issues that bank underwrites at time t. In column 2, dependent variable is 
average number of participating banks in issues underwritten by bank i in country j at time t. In column 1 I control 
for number of domestic issues in country j at time t relative to total number of issues during t. In column 2, I control 
for number of underwriting banks participating in issues where at least one bank is domestic.  Sample consists of 11 
144 bank-country-month observations over the period 2002-2011. See table 1 for variable definitions. T values are 
presented in parentheses; standard errors (not presented) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
bank level; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
   (1)  (2) 
Underwriting share  
# issues  # participants   
Foreign issue  ‐0.28***  0.26* 
(‐10.45) (1.78)
Foreign issue * Shock bank country  ‐0.09*** ‐0.17
(‐2.68) (‐0.78)
Foreign issue * Shock issuer country  0 0.23*
(0.35)  (1.85) 
Number of domestic issues  1.08***    
(12.2)    
Lead bank share in domestic issues       
     
Number of participants in domestic issues     0.5*** 
   (28.06) 
Shock bank country  ‐0.15*  0.64** 
(‐1.89)  (2.47) 
Issuer country FE  Yes  Yes 
Time FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  11 144  11 144 
R‐squared  0.35 0.41 
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7. CONCLUSION	
In this paper I study how negative shock taking place at the home market of the bank affects level 
of home bias in its country level underwriting portfolio. I hypothesize that bank experiencing a 
crisis at its home market becomes more risk averse and thus prone to withdraw from foreign 
markets which it observes to become more risky relatively to its home market. Methodology used 
in this study follows by large the one introduced by Giannetti and Laeven (2012) in their paper 
on syndicated loan market. Diverge from their study I concentrate on bank’s role as an 
intermediary between bond issuers and investors. Thus, my results are not comparable with the 
reference study per se. However, I am able to show that the flight home effect introduced by 
Giannetti and Laeven is not restricted to syndicated loan market but prevails also when bank’s 
effective risk position is limited to issue process of a bond. 
I find that proportion of foreign issues in bank’s underwriting portfolio decreases by 27% when 
hit by crisis at its home market. The effect is limited to transparent and higher quality issuers, 
indicating homogeneous treatment of more opaque and lower credit quality issuers during crisis 
independent of their geographic origin. I also find clear evidence of increased preference for 
issuers domiciled in markets where sovereign credit quality is higher than the one in bank’s home 
economy, indicating that my results are to some extent driven by flight-to-quality considerations. 
Moreover, I show that banks treat such foreign and domestic issuers equally with whom they 
have had a relationship in the past, either in form of syndicated loan or prior bond issue.  
I find that geographical distance between the mandated bank and the issuer is positively 
correlated with the increase in bank’s home bias during crisis. I find no evidence that common 
familiarity traits between the bank and a foreign issuer would dilute the increase in home bias. 
However, I do observe that banks seek to limit their currency exposure by withdrawing to larger 
extent from foreign markets within the same currency area when hit by crisis at their home 
market. I also find that banks increase their exposure in distressed markets within the same 
currency area when not hit by crisis at home. My hypotheses and main results are presented in 
table 14. 
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Table 14 
Hypotheses and results. This table summarizes hypotheses and main results. 
   Hypothesis                                                     Result 
H1  Bond issuers prefer geographically 
proximate banks when distributing 
underwriting mandates.   
 Strong  support.  Banks  are  biased  towards  their  home  markets  in  general. 
Amount of  issues  in banks underwriting portfolio per country  is  lower by some 
30% for foreign issuers.  
H2  Home bias in distribution of bond 
underwriting mandates increases 
during adverse economic 
conditions. 
 Strong  support. Banks decrease amount of  issues  in  foreign markets  relatively 
more  compared  to  their  home  market  when  experiencing  a  crisis  at  home. 
Decrease in monthly amount is 27% for foreign markets.   
H3  Increase in home bias is a result of 
bank’s preference to underwrite 
higher credit quality issuers during 
crisis. 
 Medium  support.  When  experiencing  a  crisis  at  their  home  market,  banks 
withdraw  to  lesser  extent  from  countries  where  underlying  sovereign  credit 
quality is higher than the one in their home market. 
H4  Prior relationship between the 
underwriting bank and the issuer 
alleviates increase in home bias. 
 Medium  support.  Banks  treat  their  relationship  firms  equally  independent  of 
their home origin when crisis hits banks' home market.    
H5  Decrease in proportion of foreign 
underwritings during crisis is 
smaller for more reputable banks. 
 No  support.  More  reputable  banks  have  relatively  larger  exposure  in  foreign 
markets.  There  is  no  evidence  that more  reputable  banks would withdraw  to 
lesser extent from foreign markets during adverse economic conditions at their 
home country 
H6  Increase in home bias is less 
pronounced when the underwriting 
bank share common familiarity 
characteristics with the issuer. 
 Medium  support.  Banks  withdraw  to  lesser  extent  from  markets  which  are 
geographically closer. No evidence that banks would withdraw less from markets 
which share common legal origin, language or religion with them. 
     
 
 
7.1 Avenues for future research 
Aim of this study is to assess variation of home bias over time in distribution of international 
bond underwriting mandates and seek reasons which can help us to understand the ultimate cause 
of the home bias phenomenon in this context. Existing literature on the variation of home bias 
over time is yet limited and offers interesting topics to be studied in the future.  
My findings serve wide range of paths for future research. Results presented in this study are 
from the period where crisis is still ongoing, thus serving a good starting point for a research in 
the future. It will be interesting to see how increase in home bias observed here will shape when 
economic conditions relieve. Also, my research scope is rather extensive leaving room to study 
the phenomenon more in detail within different geographical regions or among issuers from 
specific industries. Foremost, as results of this study are limited to decision making between the 
bond issuer and the underwriting bank, it would be interesting to see how home bias varies over 
time at level of individual bond investors and their allocation of capital among different bond 
issues. 
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